Jan Kieniewicz

EAST AND WEST: CIVILISATIONS AND THEIR HISTORY

01: 03.06.2003

EAST AND WEST AS CIVILISATIONS: MYTHS AND REALITY

Let us start with very conventional remark. Kipling told us that East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet (The Ballad of East and West, 1889). The sense of his statement is clear, birth, breed and border separate different people until they shall stand at Great Judgement Day. But "Kipling was wrong. East and West have met, and the result is blood and suffering, political and economic chaos, and ideological wars of a pattern that is becoming sordidly commonplace. For the first time many in the West have come face to face with Asia and in a contracting world found, rather surprisingly, that the troubles of so remote an area could affect the lives of people in New York, London and Paris." This opinion of Michael Edwardes dates from 1958 and may still be taken as expression of average Western opinion about the contacts between East and West. It is still very common. However, I think it not at all correct and, as I find it, it represents a specificity of the colonial mind. For centuries people of different cultures met on battlefields, markets and other places. I will try to demonstrate that people could meet as equal under some specific conditions. May we say, that East and West was about eternal confrontation of people from different civilisations?

East and West have been geographical notions for centuries, at least for people who lived in the Mediterranean World. Since the ancient Greeks till modern Italian the world has been defined by Dawn and Twilight of the sun, Oriens and Occidens were cardinal point of orientation. Alexander the Great, Roman Empire, Omayyad Kaliphate and Osman Empire grew and decayed on this axis of exchange and confrontation. In the great map of Claudius Ptolomeus of Alexandria ( II cent.), we may see that the world is concentrated around the axis going from China to Spain, from Britain to Sumatra. Over land and ocean roads people travel from the one end of the earth to the another, while the Silk Road and the Spice Road both served people in their trade and other activities. For centuries human activities were connected with roads going east and west with goods, money, experiences, knowledge and beliefs. May we suppose, that such was the essential relation between East and West?

During several centuries Christian and Islamic Mediterranean World has forgot the tradition of spatial presentation of their own essence. Commercial relations diminished, because the West was not rich enough to sustain the always negative commercial balance with the East - China and India. The myth of the east, of the fabulous Orient, is very old, older than the conscious identification of Europeans as Westerners. Populous, rich and fascinating world of the East is depicted by Milton in Paradise lost:

"High on a throne of royal state, which far

Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind,

Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand

Showers on her kings barbaric pearl and gold".

The Ptolemaic world was then reduced to the T-O presentation of Mapae Mundi during the Middle Ages. The difference between the two representations is substantial but, in fact, both present the same vision of the closed oikumene. We may see Jerusalem as the core, with Asia separated from Europe by the Tanais (river Don) and from Africa by the Nile. Mediterranean See rather separates than connects Europe with Africa, divided by Christian-Islamic confrontation for thousand years. T-O Mapae is an ideological concept of the world in which East is reduced to the Oriental part of empires created by Omayyads, Abbasids, Mongols and Turks. The West is connected with Carolingian domain, and the frontier was going between Latin and Greek Christianity. The situation change with European expansion in 15th and 16th centuries and discovery of America.

So let us examine expansion in its modern phase, when it transcends the Continent. To reach a different World becomes discovery. This happens regardless of the extent to which those Worlds were familiar or unknown. Obviously, non-European civilisations existed independent of potential knowledge about them. On the other hand, in the reality produced by European civilisation, the worlds of alien civilisations were brought into being by their discovery and resultant processes, up to the creation of a new reality of the conquered World.

Order can be introduced through several available scenarios of events, as analysed from the point of view of their repercussions. According to this interpretation, discovery is the result of reaching the target and embarking upon attempted penetration. The arrivals have their own goals and visions, and plan their conduct suitably. It appears, however, that in each case they make an effort to overcome barriers protecting the system of culture they came across. This process differs greatly in time and space, and depends primarily on the character of the penetrated society. But in each instance, we are dealing with an analogous sequence of behaviour caused by an awareness of being alien. Those who reach the Other experience complex and variegated emotions, and the feeling of being alien makes them conscious of their own identity. First, Europe is discovered and then the Worlds are named.

The initial state of conduct achieves proximity, a process which discloses an awareness of the ‘we-they’ opposition. This relation is familiar to participants of earliest expeditions. First, the seekers discover schemes known to them, then their experience reveals the distinctness of the situation. Such are the first reactions in America and Asia where newcomers wish to see their own visions and act according to a scheme deduced from the reconquista and the experiences of Portuguese factories in West Africa.

The discoverers have a long path behind them; so do their successors. We have Columbus pursuing the vision of the country of the Great Khan, or the men of Cabral trying to overcome the distance imposed by the timid or distrustful natives. But also Vasco da Gama, carried to Kozhikode to meet the samorin, sees, feels and can touch, although he still does not know the location of the boundary. The arrivals need to come closer in order to experience the border. Only then do they realise that the new relation will signify crossing frontiers. This is why displacement is accompanied by confrontation, a chaotic process also in those instances when it is experienced by consecutive, better organised discoverers. Confrontation means that the former see something, and try to put the newly discovered world into order. The ascertainment of distinctness is accompanied by perception, an attempt to classify and describe. All experiences, a conscious and unconscious legacy, regardless of the level of probable intellectual reflection, are mobilised. Success, and possibly life itself, depends on this. Perception is, of course, tantamount to naming, to interpretation. Despite its restrictions, it is a constant process which leads to identification.

All meanings of protection are involved here, but mainly the protection of the distinctness of one's own existence. By becoming aware of arrival in a new place, and the ensuing threats, the discoverers recreate an identifying and protecting space. It is precisely within this space, as if during a "stopover", that they transform themselves into conquerors.

The establishment of close relations and the creation of one's own space lead to enormously differentiated scenarios of events. They contain both endeavours for participating in the discovered World and efforts to destroy it. In each case, this means that identification is accompanied by the boundary. Expansion is the crossing of successive borders.

I call this process ‘contact’, an organised deployment of force in order to penetrate the space of an alien social system. Entry always required the application of force, and I have, therefore, tried to indicate the essential differentiation of forms. Following this trail of thought, I found out that the difference of contact was not decisive for results. One of the consequences of contact was conquest. In this way, it was possible to solve a problem which appeared the moment one's own identity became obvious. I intentionally omit those instances in which contact led to the destruction or subjugation of the other social system. In extremely differentiated realities, the conquerors shaped new systems which sometimes defined another boundary.

The West born from expansion has become a synonym of Christian Europe. But its origins were connected with consolidation of civilisation. What does civilisation mean? Usually we think about civilisation following our common sense, in unreflected practice i.e. of Roman Civilisation, Western Civilisation, Islamic Civilisation and even Human Civilisation. I understand the notion differently. First of all, I refuse to understand the idea of civilisation as some higher level of human evolution. This feeling appears with Enlightenment and was developed on several ways during the colonial period. It seems that such approach remain popular even in academic education.

In very common understanding, civilisation means relatively high level of cultural and technological development, thinking of civilisation as material standard of life and of culture as a spiritual one. Many scholars consider civilisation to be a form of domination over the environment and take culture for a whole human output. Sometimes civilisation is seen as the cultural community of many nations. Many people, however, presume that culture is enough and refuse to use the term civilisation. My assumption is that there are many civilisations. Their confrontation is a natural state. Civilisations do not strive for unification, there is no global civilisation, and its emergence is not desirable. What is beneficial is greater openness of them all. First, we need to make clear what I understand under the term civilisation. As I have said, this is not a higher state that people reach from the savage and barbarian levels of the human species evolution. Proposals for defining civilisation have one drawback: they are an attempt at classifying. Because of this, they are eurocentric. As consequence, an illusion of convergence appears. Or, there is a growing fear of imperialism.

In my opinion civilisations do not create systems, they have no identity. They are exclusively states of awareness. Relations always occur between people. Consequently, confrontations between civilisations are relations between different social systems. To quote famous French historian Fernand Braudel: "…one should therefore give up certain habits of language: stop speaking of civilisation as a being or an organism, or a personality, or a body, even if just historical. One should stop saying that it is born, develops and dies, because this in fact means endowing it with a linear and simple human fate."

In 1921, a Polish historian Feliks Koneczny wrote: "If it becomes possible to explain the matter of the variety of civilisations, this will result in a new view on general history, which has to describe the mutual relations between various civilisations. General history has to be treated as the history of battles between civilisations and attempts at syntheses of civilisations, the history of their expansions and wanings, the history of the emergence of cultures and their mutual impact within one civilisation, or else their succumbing to a foreign civilisation, and thus the history of the mutual influences of civilisations, influences both positive and negative. General history will become the history of methods of the system of collective life…". Huntington offered the same vision in 1996 when he wrote: "The history of mankind is the history of civilisations. … In the course of history it was civilisations that gave people the broadest framework for defining their own identity."

I accept these suggestions. Consequently, I believe, civilisations are such sets of social systems which have developed as a result of the emergence and continuance of the conviction and the will of people who have been creating those systems concerning their affiliation to a community broader than that formed by their proper group / social / national / state bond (tribe, people, nation, state), to a community thus broader than their own culture. Therefore, I see civilisation as a form of defining people's affiliation over and above the cultures that separate them. This sense of affiliation stems from the fact that people of different societies, cultures and nations refer to the same system of values. This means that people build their identity with the help of principles and patterns that they share with people of a different identity, culture or statehood. Values were defined over a long period and originate from religion. Civilisation does not give people a separate identity, it offers them a new space of identification, an awareness of affiliation. In the European civilisation, values originate from Christianity.

As we have seen, I do not agree with Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisation and the Remaking of World Order ("Civilisation is the greatest cultural unit, the broadest framework to express the own identity, in general identified with great religions"). In the multitude of definitions I am closer to Koneczny’s (On the plurality of civilisations, 1962) vision of civilisation as the methods of common life system than to Toynbee’s, Spengler’s, Bagby’s, Dawson’s, Braudel’s, McNeill’s and many others’. Most of them take civilisations as historically defined greater social units. I do not regard cultures as local modifications of civilisations; on the contrary, I emphasise the individual character of formative processes of affiliation. We may speak of cultural areas, understood as a sort of affinity of different social systems. History of civilisation is then a specific vision of human activities and beliefs, of what people feel and express about its own affiliation to the community of values over the cultural, ethnic or state divisions.

In this sense I will take East and West as civilisations. It is clear that the concept of the East is older than the West but the meaning and understanding of the former change with the formation of the western consciousness. The first creation of the East were older than the Europe itself, during Greek, Hellenistic and Roman time. The first important step toward the civilisational expression of the East was the formation of the Eastern Roman Empire, and Byzance. Several eastern Churches in ancient times gave sense of specificity to the Roman Latin Christianity long before the definitive rupture between Catholics and the Orthodox in the 11th century. During the late Middle Ages, some sense of Western form of life and feeling of difference with not only Muslims but also Christians appears.

The mythology of the East had appeared before Roman Catholics created the self-understanding as Europeans or Westerners. I do not have impression of similar feeling among Muslims in Spain or Palestine during reconquista or Crusade confrontations with unbelievers. The notion of the East had no sense in India or China until the European expansion had introduced it. When Europe was born as a specific form of affiliation during Renaissance and the Age of Discoveries, the West appears as definition of geographical rather than civilisational division of one Christian community. The next step was connected with expansion of knowledge of the World and the tendency to describe and understand Others in so many different countries in Asia. The European identity grew in the close confrontation with cultures of Asia during the 16-17th centuries. The pre-colonial expansion and pre-capitalist world-system were essential for the process in which Asiatic East change into the Eurocentric Orient.

Even then the West was not a myth and had not real life. The second element of importance was division of Europe into two different economic zones which now are understand as core and periphery of the world-economy. The existence of Eastern part of Europe with different economic and social organisation start to push the core countries into the self-identification as ‘the West’. But the history of the West as a civilisation starts with the French Revolution and colonial expansion. Orientalism before colonial domination ought to be understood as the feeling of something attractive in the generalised vision of the East.

Before Colonialism Europeans did not have any clear notion of Oriental civilisations and their vision of the "Easterners" was in fact close to the our way of thinking. In the European imaginary, several eastern or Asiatic cultures existed at that time, understood as India, China, Japan or Persia. From our perspective we may say that Indian, Chinese, Japanese or Persian civilisation existed as separate units for Europeans before they realised their own Western identity.

The myth of the East persisted until the colonial era, and was even strengthened during Enlightenment fascination. The reality of the East remained unchanged until the European conquests in the 19th century. The reality of Europe started to change a century earlier with the beginning of industrial revolution in England and the capitalism. After the discovery of the East, the formation of the West as a myth came, first in the occidental developed countries and then in the peripheries of the world-system. The West was born in consequence of this transformation.

East was East and West was West, as we have remembered in the beginning. But both were just a part of the one world and the mutual interdependency appeared just in the same time as colonialism. But Kipling was right when he said that:

"But there is neither East nor West,

Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,

When two strong men stand face to face

though they come from the ends of the earth!"

Before the final conclusion, let us briefly review the colonial period to see how two strong men could stand face to face and what it could mean.

02: 04.06.2003

IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM: THE HISTORY OF EAST AND WEST

The history of East and West begin with colonial expansion and is marked by two phenomena: imperialism and colonialism. I use both terms in a new sense, insofar as the colloquial meaning may be misleading. The first approach to this subject ought to start with some preliminary explanations of what happened to the people of the East when the White Man came with his capacity of destruction and his will of domination. I would like to do so in very general terms.

It is my intention to present relations between the European civilisation and other civilisations in the aftermath of expansion. What I have in mind is predominantly the establishment of the nature of those relations and subsequently their impact upon European and Asian civilisation. The relations between the East and the West should be presented as a chain of European impacts and an ensuing dependency of the East. Imperialism will be a convenient name for a steady tendency of European states to impose their dominion over Eastern people. Colonialism will be a form in which dependent social system converts its structure in a process of compulsory adaptation. Colonialism facilitated the subjugation of Eastern people to the rule of Europeans, imposed through imperialism. Both processes were in their final version the confrontation of different systems of values which took place in a common space of a culturally defined set of transmissible messages. We have a lot of such spaces and for the purpose of our problem the first one will be that of civilisational borderlands.

An initial hypothesis suggests that civilisational borderlands emerged in the course of European expansion. They were part of the European world although not always and not necessarily were they encompassed by the European geographic range. These specific realities performed an essential role in transmission and reception between the worlds. They also exerted decisive influence upon the life of societies situated not so much "between" as "within" borderland space. Consequently, I would like to consider whether the outcome was the shaping of societies different from others. This is, at the same time, an inquiry about the part played by those societies in European civilisation.

My hypothesis does not ignore the impact of Europe on the shaping of the worlds, i.e. other civilisations, including the present-day perspective of a global civilisational community. However, by opposing the globalist suggestion, attention is drawn to the repercussions of this expansion for Europe and primarily to the differentiation of roles acted by the societies creating it.

This is not an attempt at defining civilisations, and especially at determining the civilisational identity of Europe. The conviction that such a civilisation exists is quite sufficient, as is the recollection of the complexity of relations between people, their products and environment in time and in connection with a given territory. As a result, I have in mind a system in which interpersonal relations come into being due to the presence and acceptance of a shared system of values. It is this set of inherited values which gives societies a chance for a dialogue, and thus the transmission of one's own identity and the acceptance of that of others. In its capacity as a feature of European civilisation, dialogue is, simultaneously, the result of clearly delineated and distinct cultural identities. These peculiar features and their opposites form conditions for a dialogue. So we have our first question: is the dialogue between East and West possible? And if not, what kind of relation would be specific for the confrontation in colonial age?

I would like to distinguish very clearly, although not too strictly, a conception of space from territory. Regions subjected to people who represent a certain civilisation could belong to variables indispensably identifying concrete society. This fact, however, is not decisive for the exclusive nature of the attitude of a given community towards their territory. The intensity of relations between nations and their native land denotes, primarily, the need for transferring emotions to the most direct concrete. The mystique of land becomes a secondary phenomenon, a symptom of an essential need for identification.

The borderland is a natural concept connected with territoriality. We employ it in particular to express the specificity of regions situated alongside a physical boundary, such as ethnic and state but also cultural frontiers which occur at every step of the way in mediaeval and modern Europe. These are neighbouring borderlands. I do not claim that, as a result, relations along a borderland with another civilisation are basically different. I do believe, however, that the situation changes fundamentally during expansion.

Civilisational borderlands are, therefore, not identical with their territorial counterparts. It is also quite a different border which is at stake. Inter-civilisational boundaries are not necessarily tantamount to political frontiers. Convergence is the natural outcome of the existence of societies which identify themselves, or are identified, precisely by means of localisation vis a vis the boundary. Should we not seek other reasons for their distinctiveness? We should at least consider the issue in a longer period of time. What happens to a civilisation when political frontiers begin to withdraw from alien onslaught?

I accepted the assumption that expansion is a specific feature of our civilisation in the modern era. Thus, we can speak about the transmission of European civilisational space. Is this identical with its recreation elsewhere, e.g. beyond the arbitrarily comprehended European continent? Such an interpretation is debatable when expansion reaches overseas regions. Is it more obvious in such cases when there is no physical division between continents? In all instances expansion generates new interaction with the surrounding environment. I am particularly interested in changes of structures and the identity of partners in inter-civilisational relations.

I do not regards expansion to be an immanent feature of Europe. This was a tendency which first appeared, then succumbed to transformations, and ultimately disappeared. As a result, in my estimation, the original "range" of European civilisation was not delineated by expansion. Christianisation was not the outcome of conquest nor, even more so, the result of the expansion of an already formed civilisation. Naturally, the acceptance of Christianity in regions beyond the Roman times assumed various forms, if only because it was connected with two emerging civilisational formations. This was the same Christianity but already two different conceptions of the world. Without delving into those problems, we must accentuate the consequences of the acceptance of Latin as a language not only of liturgy but also of the state, law and superior culture. Greek rites and Slav liturgies eliminated or restricted this level of communication. Modern expansion, on the other hand, carried European qualities beyond those not very precisely defined boundaries. The first impetus was achieved by people of the borderland.

Examining the experiences of modern expansion we see how Christianity appeared in discovered and conquered Worlds already as an element of civilisation. There were no analogous processes comparable to the spread of Christianity in Eastern Europe. Naturally, similar incidents did take place. The Christianisation of this avant la lettre Europe entailed the conquest and physical elimination of pagans. The experiences of the Slav countries seemed to be echoed in fifteenth-century Congo, but there was probably not enough time. Attempts of this sort also failed in sixteenth-century Ceylon. The Christianisation of America was inseparable from the conquista, and created a new civilisation albeit different from the European model. What have happened in the East? European expansion and domination took the Christianity with them but without a spectacular effect this time.

Borderlands were the first circumstance of the East-West confrontation and in such space the pre-colonial mythology was born. The civilisational confrontation of colonial period took place not in the borderland spaces but just inside the subdued systems own space opened by the expansion. The problem was now of the incapacity of independent transformations of dominated systems. Colonialism was a complex process in which we can distinguish submission, captivity and utilisation as basic relations. In such conditions Orientalism appears which led to the peripheralisation of the East. The East created as European representation of the colonial mind was transformed into reality in the process of the Western domination.

The submission represents principally an unequal relationship between the new rulers and Eastern society. It was of a military and political nature. The collective memory of the societies was influenced by successive bouts of domination, of conquest and violence. From this memory a set of rules evolved that helped hold empire in order. This memory and the awareness of the force used were encoded in the relation of submission.

Captivity can be described as the acceptance of their own inferiority on the part of the societies. Material products and ideas disseminated from the Metropolises were considered superior. Captivity helped to control thinking at every level, even rebellious projects were born of imported ideologies.

Utilisation is connected mainly with economic aspects. It had to deal with extremely varied impulses of economic nature: robbery, exploitation and unequal exchange. This relation was responsible for a new economic mentality and new attitudes toward the work.

These three relations worked together in the same direction, converting every kind of available information into more dependency. Everything was finally converted against the society, even the capacity to defence and survive. The essential aspect of colonialism was that all activities strengthened backwardness. We may observe now how independent, prosperous countries loose their capacities and seems to transform into quite different reality of underdevelopment.

History of the East and West relations in the colonial era may be summarised as process in which imperialism of Europeans had produced colonialism, the original native response to this pressure. Colonialism as essential aspect of compulsory transformation was partially responsible for economic peripheralisation and social backwardness of eastern societies. In a fact it should be seen rather as a consequence of the incorporation of Asian societies to the colonial system. But what sometimes escapes our attention is that colonialism was essential in the reception and incorporation of European values. As we will demonstrate in the next chapter, colonialism blocked the possibility of a dialogue.

Such interpretation of colonialism may be essential to our understanding of the history of relations between the East and the West. Imperial domination disappeared in the second half of the 20th century, but colonialism persisted as internal disability of social systems that used external stimuli and values as the own instruments of independent transformations. In this sense the contemporary East was created by European domination. Understanding colonialism helps us to accept the fact of so called incapacity of self sustained growth in post-colonial world.

Another problem is to realise that imperialism and colonialism should be seen as challenges for civilisations. Under the Western dominance the vision of Easterners was imposed over original and independent civilisation in Asia. Not as a myth nor as a reality, the East was a form of European perception of the Western dominance and the essential proof of existence of the West itself.

03: 05.06.2003

DIALOG OR ENCOUNTER: EAST AND WEST AND CIVILISATIONAL CONFRONTATION

The clash of civilisations is a subject of perennial debate. I prefer to state that the confrontations were and will be essential for relations between people of different civilisational affiliation anywhere and anytime. There are many possible relations but I will focus on two of them: dialogue and encounter. Dialogue was and still remains essential for people from the West, whereas encounter may be understood as one of possible situations between people of two different civilisations.

Now, we have to define dialogue. First of all, it is a type of relation between persons. There is no other dialogue than between specific people, with clearly defined identities. Next, dialogue is a form of relation between people of different cultures. I don't mean a simple exchange of thoughts or viewpoints. What I do mean is the ability to offer other people one's own identity as a gift. Karol Wojtyła (December 25, 1965) said that "this is more than conversation… it is a certain attitude." "Dialogue is the ability to speak in such a way that the other person can hear and understand us, and the ability of listening so as to understand the other person."

Dialogue is an attitude towards another person. It occurs within societies, but is also developed between people from different communities. It is a kind of communication, but such that is defined by necessary inclusion of a fundamental triad of values: those shaped by love, truth and freedom. Because of this, the concept of dialogue is present primarily in a religious context. Dialogue is linked to Christianity in a closest possible way exactly because the attitude of giving requires harmony between professed and practised values. For the European experience, truth is of great importance, as the foundation of the development of identity, and also freedom allowing societies to promote and defend it.

In the second half of the 20th century, dialogue became the key to understanding viewpoints going beyond the strictly religious sphere: a direct reference to dialogue was made by Polish bishops in their famous letter to the German bishops in 1965 (they forgive Germans for their crimes against Poles and ask for the absolution of Polish sins in the same time). This concept became synonymous with an open relation between people of opposite views or attitudes, a symbol of rejecting the plane of aggressiveness. A meeting within the same sphere of values. "Giving of oneself to others" is the essence of dialogue, states Stanisław Grygiel. "Persons, families, nations, churches have to give of themselves to each other, dia-logoi - through words - they have to 'communionally' learn the truth that forms them if they are to be saved."

Dialogue is a possibility of interpersonal relations that is especially visible in the European civilisation. But not the only one. Dialogue was not sufficient to express the European tendency for conflict, just as dialectics was not, hence Edgar Morin introduced the concept of "dialogique" to emphasize that Europe is created in the things that divide it.

If dialogue is a possibility in the European civilisation, if it is a reality determining the fact that people belong to that civilisation, then we face the question: what is the equivalent of dialogue in other civilisations?

Openness to other civilisations should be the basis of dialogue. Is that enough? Is a proposal for dialogue not just another desire to develop relations according to the model of the dominating civilisation? Dialogue precludes domination. But dialogue also precludes the falseness of denying one's own identity. A proposal of dialogue means offering the best. The condition is that one acts in the truth not only about oneself, but also about others, which means we cannot initiate dialogue while maintaining false beliefs about ourselves or about others.

Does dialogue offer any possibility to determine relations between people of different civilisations, on different planes of their confrontation? Huntington foretells wars between religions which are bases for modern civilisations. Falacci predicts Islamic invasion against the dechristianised Europe. However, many people suggest dialogue instead of war. This is a suggestion that the confrontations between civilisations should not take the form of collisions. This sounds well, but seems to be a Utopian dream, not a realistic proposal. That is why I am pessimistic. For now, what dominates is the pragmatism of the cynics or the wishful thinking of the dreamers. Perhaps together with the Toffler's "third wave" of evolution of capitalism, greater openness will appear in the global world. Because globalisation makes no sense if it is to eliminate the varieties of culture.

Is dialogue between people of different civilisations possible? Certainly, if - to paraphrase Kipling - they stand face to face strong in their values, with no fear for their identities. This is certainly something worth being talked about. However, it is not certain what one could do about this.

Let us consider the relationship I have termed ‘encounter’. I must return briefly to expansion considered to be a factor that shapes relations between civilisations. Inter-civilisational communication unconnected with expansion concentrates on exchange and thus on autonomous acceptance and usage of the information which is offered or sought. The reception of certain material or cultural phenomena could affect civilisational changes but the independence of those processes is retained.

The situation becomes quite different in the case of expansion. Modern Europe expands by encroaching upon the spaces of other civilisations. This expenditure of energy takes on assorted forms, such as the conquista, conquests, annihilation, subjugation, and a number of other phenomena, usually described in accordance with natural terminology. My suggestion is to analyse how the process of reaching foreign territory and meeting another society sets aggression free and attempts at invading distinct and independent civilisational space. Although this always signifies a confrontation of concrete people with a community of a different culture, the ensuing events can be interpreted as interactions of two system spaces.

I would like to examine the borders of civilisations and phenomena symptomatic for the borderland in this particular convention.

We can say that, by stemming from separate systems of values, relations between civilisations do not find a necessary level of understanding. Exchange does not become dialogue. Civilisations which share a system of values, e.g. owing to joint descent, probably find it easier to communicate, but it is not certain whether they become involved in a dialogue. By this I mean both a community within the Christianity of Russia and Europe, and within the humanism of America and Europe. Does expansion alter these relations?

So far, I have been interested primarily in the consequences of European expansion to social systems of other civilisations. For these purposes, I have prepared a systematic arrangement of relations to which I shall refer. At the moment, however, I concentrate my attention on the effects of expansion for its participants. I focus my attention on those strongly differentiated cases when crossing a boundary resulted in the necessity and possibility of establishing some sort of an equilibrium, a state which I described as an encounter.

Assuming this viewpoint, we can regard the borderland as a feature characteristic for the space of the European civilisation system in the course of expansion. The encounter, conceived as a specific state of relations between the two parties involved, is a sporadic and fleeting symptom of this property. In greatly varied instances, it appears as a possibility, or a relatively constant situation. I will enumerate only several due to the different degree of meeting the assumed conditions:

- "First discoveries in the New World". These local phenomena are rather short-lived, and accompany the arrival of the discoverers in unknown lands or to unknown peoples. Chronologically, they coincide with the turn of the fifteenth century, but recur also much later. The newcomers are not always aware of the fact that they are performing yet another "discovery". We can, therefore, take into consideration not only experiences confirmed in reports by the first discoverers, but also those evidenced by their continuators. This finding of situations, which could be called an encounter, is considerably hindered, mainly owing to the briefness of relations.

- A much more relevant and numerous group of instances is provided by the conquista in America up to the eighteenth century. This fact is connected with the duration of "Indian" civilisations which were not destroyed or subjugated during the first stage of contact, true not only for classical examples of the "wartime boundary", as in the case of Araucania. I would be inclined to say that the latter and other similar instances make the impression of "armed propinquity" from the time of the Iberian reconquista than that of an encounter. These examples also include realities created by European settlers in North America, South Africa and Asia. A separate reality of an encounter was moulded by the British conquest of India.

- It may be easiest to notice encounter as a property of the borderland wherever contact had not led immediately or outright to subjugation, as in Goa from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. In contrast to the American examples, this "mini -Portugal" in India was surrounded by strong state centres of another civilisation. Inasmuch as we discover obvious domination within superior authority, the former had very clearly outlined boundaries. Consequently, we are dealing with a simultaneous presence of different phenomena, and métisage accompanies the retention of cultural distinctness. Goa is only the best known case.

I would like to propose an attractive hypothesis and to consider the possibility of applying the category of the encounter also in certain cases of missionary Christianisation. I think of the spread of Christianity unprecedented by the conquista. Beyond the reach of European authority, missionary activity was, as a rule, conducted in alien cultural space, and as such is part of a separate topic. Upon certain occasions, however, the emergent configuration of an equilibrium was based on an unstable combination of political, economic and cultural factors. This was the reality founded in Malabar from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.

In Goa, the Portuguese created a society which cultivated strong relations with Europe and numerous relations with the civilisation of India. Nonetheless, Goa succumbed to the impact of India. In Malabar, where to the end of the eighteenth century the Europeans did not wield territorial power, they came across existing local, non-European Christians. Relations between the latter and Roman Christianity, and then Protestant missions, remained relatively balanced. I pose the question whether in conditions of political domination and a concurrence of economic interest, a community of faith could produce circumstances conducive for an encounter. There are serious arguments in favour of special attention to this reality of a permeation of various civilisations within the range of the same religion. This particular case is even more interesting, considering that there are no references to a territorial frontier.

Borderlands between civilisations are perceived, however, overwhelmingly on the European Continent. Without questioning this obvious fact, I would like to stress that it is exactly here that the distinguishing of territorial and spatial phenomena calls for precision. Naturally, the objects of special attention are the Iberian peninsula during the reconquista, the Balkan peninsula in various phases of its history, and the pre-partition Polish Commonwealth. In all those cases, we deal with different types of boundaries which are connected with the presence of other civilisations. Do we encounter a phenomenon which could testify to the emergence of some sort of an equilibrium between them?

In modern times, expansion of the European continent to the east transcends the "original areas" of Roman Christianity but does not embark upon the elimination of people, their culture and religion. There occurs an asymmetry of influence - the effect of the attraction of Polish culture. It would be difficult to speak about Polonisation as the instrument of colonial domination. In the Commonwealth I discern the presence of a civilisational borderland the range of which expands in conditions of balanced impacts. Would it be justified to seek the reality of the encounter in modern times?

In turn, the earlier Iberian example demonstrates a long lasting coexistence of civilisations; on the other hand, it testifies to physical elimination. In the period of its creation, Spain won territory but accepted others as if they "belonged" to the same civilisation. Hence, I speak about "neighbours", and doubt the capability of conducting a dialogue. The reconquista, however, was followed by a tendency to treat others as aliens. Spain ejected from her territory Moslems and Jews in the 15th century, who at the same time were accepted by the Polish Commonwealth. Nonetheless, I would be inclined to look for the encounter also in Iberian conditions.

I would like to cite an example in which three centuries of close relations with Europe did not bring about conquest and dependence. Such a country was Malabar, where European authority was established as late as the turn of the eighteenth century. In the course of almost three hundred years expanded penetration of the Portuguese, Dutch and British did not alter the structures of the local social system. The Europeans created enclaves in which they lived in their own way but which were not separated from the locals; nor did they provide sovereign power. Within each range, there existed a balanced relation which for centuries produced a sui generis equilibrium. The stimuli conveyed by the Europeans were not ignored or rejected, but their reception did not affect structures of the local social systems. Also for the European community in Malabar, albeit not very numerous, information obtained from local society did not constitute a hazard. The phenomenon of métisage was much less distinct than in Goa where the Portuguese possessed actual territorial superiority.

The characteristic feature of the civilisational encounter in Malabar was, as I have mentioned, the presence of a local Christian Church with a fifteen centuries-old tradition. This meant that the presence of Malabar Christians was a natural phenomenon. Their social integration resulted from acknowledgement of the caste system; Christians composed one of the higher caste groups which differed from others with regard only to professed religion. However, this unprecedented closeness, which was not understood right away and became appreciated very late, did not form a bridge. Malabar Christianity opened itself up to newcomers without resorting to force. Nonetheless, each attempt at a closer union contained the core of destruction. Missionary ventures among the Malabar Christians did not form a road towards Europeanisation, and their limited success became a source of destruction. Through their representatives, both civilisations emitted intensive impulses but the latter were either effectively absorbed or transformed. Both structures remained untouched despite a shared religion. Prior to colonial times, this encounter of Christians in Malabar disclosed distinct asymmetry. The original Malabar Church was dissolved and the social position of the Saint Thomas Christians was weakened owing to contacts with the Europeans. On the other hand, the Christian Churches in India, which appeared in Malabar as a consequence of three hundred years of mission campaigns, did not assume European traits. They were not accepted into the caste community but belonged to factors which introduced change into that system.

In Malabar, Christianity became a much more prominent factor than anywhere in India, but its position was the outcome of a local and not a European tradition. Here, the boundary was neither territorial nor social. Europeans who visited the local Church recognised or questioned its orthodoxy by observing civilisational criteria.

The specific circumstances of the encounter in Malabar did not influence European civilisation which did not produce its own hybrid in India. The reason was probably that all that which was European remained isolated. Societies which were the result of expansion proved to be transient and either were forced to leave or became part of that World. In India, that which was permanent found its ultimate place in Indian civilisation, while that which was distinctly European proved to be impermanent.

Borderlands played an essential role in the transmission of information about European civilisation. For a long time, they were the only source. What could be said about reception? In the borderlands, the meaning of adoptions from local cultures could be clearly seen. It can be said that the borderlands offered Europe a vision of the worlds along with the products of foreign culture. The striking feature of the testimonies of reception is, at times, the absence of interpretations. All told, however, Europe for centuries accepted that which corresponded to her needs and visions. Elements of foreign cultures were treated as commodities or loot, even when they were admired and used.

Transmissions created in the Borderlands were underestimated, but even in cases to the contrary we notice that the reality of alien civilisations was deformed by the process of reception, proved to be incomprehensible, and ultimately, as a rule, became subjected to false interpretations. Finally, societies of the borderland accepted the European point of view, especially when the relation of domination/dependence between colonies and metropolises became consolidated. In those cases when such societies did not want to come to terms with the new order, they could rebel. This was usually the beginning of a route leading to the rise of a new civilisation.

We could say that the transmission role played by the borderlands did not prove to be the most important. Sooner than later, they were forced to face the problem of choosing a path, especially there where local civilisations tried to reach the source and reject mediation. The most prominent effect of the appearance of the borderlands seems to be the emergence of new European societies. They were not numerous but they enhanced the dialogue by expanding the sui generis "genetic pool" of civilisation. This observation refers primarily to relatively closer societies, but it must be noted that it was not distance which was decisive for the possibility and permanence of participation in the European "civilisational whirlpool".

Borderlands came into being when expansion offered the possibility of a relation described as an encounter. They endured as long as European civilisation revealed a capability for expansion. The phenomenon of the European borderland disappears together with the decline of expansion and under pressure exerted from the outside.

The last issue which should be discussed in connection with the analysis of the role of civilisational borderlands is their fate following the stage of expansion. Wherever synthesis and new civilisations did not occur, Europe evacuated itself in a more or less orderly manner. Within this context, the fate of the Eastern borderland appears to be specific. Here, the history of the partitions of Poland had left its imprint. First of all, the elimination of the state produced the impression that the processes in question were strictly political. Whole ideology and a greatly effective propaganda were created for this purpose. As a result, attention was not paid to the gradual elimination of the European borderland. It was accepted that after 1815 European civilisation was engaged more in expansion than in restrictions. Those who thought otherwise did not exercise considerable influence. As a result, the decline of a civilisation was not perceived as a European process and, at most, as a local Polish-Russian conflict. When in the 1930s the Soviet authorities destroyed Ukraine, Europe wished to notice only inevitable victims on the path of progress. Meanwhile, Ukraine was the most distinct product of the European borderland. Her national identity emerged as an opposition against Polishness in a typically European fashion. Her definition as a state had to take place in opposition to Russia and through emphasising European affiliation.

Such an interpretation of the borderland cannot but contribute to the definition of the subjects of the encounter. In my opinion, the dialogue is a specifically European relation between cultures, while the encounter refers to phenomena taking place between civilisations. It is necessary for them to find a common and parallel status. This is the reason why I assume that borderlands are spaces for the encounter of worlds.

The boundaries of European civilisation are still visible in the form of material traces but we do not know how far does the capability of the rebirth of the system of values and national identities reach. The phenomenon of the borderland originated during an era of expansion was characteristic for its ability of being involved in an encounter, a parallel relation with other civilisations. This was not a universal phenomenon nor was it permanent. We should not overestimate the impact which the encounter had on the course of events. Nonetheless, I would like to stress the creative role of such relations. The encounter proved to be an inspiration in all of the meanings of the term. It played an essential role in the dawn of new non-European civilisations, and was of decisive importance for the retention of European qualities even in conditions of a long-term severance of the civilisational bond. The encounter was the most original creation of the borderland space and still remains a chance for Europe.

Encounter happens to be a situation of people of different civilisations in confrontation, under condition of certain equilibrium space. It was difficult to find such conditions under colonial period. Probably marginal regions, a sort of borderlands of the European expansion, may offer cases of encounter which gave impulse to Kiplings' statement. But, in general, the colonial situation was of totally opposite character: that of domination and captivity which led to modernisation. The modern refusal of European system of values connected with some sort of renaissance of tradition may be seen as reaction. It could take a form of fundamentalism but it is not a destiny but result of specific circumstances.

Being sceptic about the possibility of dialogue between civilisations, I presume that this form of interpersonal relation remains fundamental for the European identity. If not, there will be a few opportunities for encounter between people of different civilisational affiliation.