PROGRAMME
30.04.2006 (Sunday) – Warsaw
12.00–20.00 : registration [‘Sokrates’ University Hotel in Warsaw]
20.00 : get-together party [‘Sokrates’ University Hotel in Warsaw]
1.05.2006 (Monday) – Białowieża
9.00–13.00 : bus transfer from Warsaw to the Seminar venue in Białowieża
13.30–14.30 : lunch
15.00–15.20 : Inauguration
15.20–16.40 : session 1:
15.20–16.00 : Johannes Bronkhorst: ‘What did Indian Philosophers Believe?’
16.00–16.40 : Ashok Aklujkar: ‘Grammarians’ leaving logic at the door’
16.40–17.00: coffee break
17.00–18.20 : session 2:
17.00–17.40 : Carmen Dragonetti and Fernando Tola: ‘The Ontological Proof and Bhartr@hari’
17.40–18.20 : John Vattanky, S. J.: ‘Theism: The Culmination of Nya@ya Logic’
18.20–19.00 : Kengo Harimoto: ‘Abandoning Logic in the case of C@ag@kara’
19.00–21.00 : dinner
2.05.2006 (Tuesday) – Białowieża
9.00–10.00 : breakfast
10.00–11.20 : session 3:
10.00–10.40 : Raghunath Ghosh: ‘Can there be Unbiased Epistemology in Indian Philosophy?’
10.40–11.20 : Claus Oetke: ‘Prama@n@a, Belief and Decision’
11.20–11.40 : coffee break
11.40–13.00 : session 4:
11.40–12.20 : Shujun Motegi: ‘Early Concepts of Logic in the Sa@m@khya’
12.20–13.00 : Philipp Maas: ‘Valid Knowledge and Belief in Classical Sa@m@khya-Yoga’
13.00–14.00 : lunch
14.30–19.00 : excursion (Wisent Sanctuary, Orthodox church in Hajnowka, Oak trail trek across the Białowieża National Park)
19.00–20.00 : dinner
3.05.2006 (Wednesday) – Białowieża
9.00–10.00 : breakfast
and time for a walk and talk…
13.00–14.00 : lunch
14.20–16.30: session 5:
14.20–15.10 : Karl Potter: ‘Should Dharmaki@rti have given in so easily to Yoga@ca@ra?’
15.10–15.50 : Dan Arnold: ‘On Semantics and Sam@keta: Thoughts on a Neglected Problem with Apoha’
15.50–16.30 : Vincent Eltschinger: ‘Studies in Dharmaki@rti’s Religious Philosophy: The Cinta@mayi@ Prajj@a@’
16.30–17.00: coffee break
17.00–18.20 : session 6:
17.00–17.40 : Horst Lasic: ‘A hot dispute about lukewarm air: Digna@ga on a@pta-va@da’
17.40–18.20 : Stephen Phillips: ‘Sensitivity to defeaters (ba@dhaka) as intrinsic to knowledge of inference-warranting concomitance (vya@pti)’
18.20–19.00 : Toshihiko Kimura: ‘Imperfect Reduction to Absurdity in the Proofs of Indian Metaphysics’
19.00–20.00 : dinner (bonfire)
4.05.2006 (Thursday) – Białowieża
9.00–10.00 : breakfast
10.00–11.20 : session 7:
10.00–10.40 : Taisei Shida: ‘On the Distribution of Validity and Invalidity at the Origination of Cognition: What is the “General Cause of Cognition” and the “Causal factor for Validity”?’
10.40–11.20 : Peter Flügel: ‘Power and Insight in Jain Discourse’
11.20–11.40 : coffee break
11.40–13.00 : session 8:
11.40–12.20 : Hiroshi Marui: ‘Considering the ‘six tarkas’ in the Nya@ya-maj@jari@’
12.20–13.00 : Piotr Balcerowicz: ‘What exists for the Vaic@es@ika?’
13.00–14.30 : lunch
14.30–19.00 : excursion (Natural Museum & Primeval Forest Sanctuary)
19.00–20.00 : dinner
5.05.2006 (Friday):
9.00–12.30: return to Warsaw
ABSTRACTS
OF THE SEMINAR PAPERS
ASHOK AKLUJKAR
(The University of British Columbia, Canada)
Grammarians’ leaving logic at the door
Verses found in Trika@n@d@i@ or Va@kyapadi@ya 1.30-42 (na@gama@d r@te dharmas ... vinipa@to na durlabhah@) have been frequently cited in Sanskrit philosophical and grammatical works over at least the last 1500 years. The same verses have repeatedly attracted the attention of modern scholars writing on Indian philosophy and producing (the usually helpful elucidatory and historical) secondary literature. They are occasioned by Bhartr@hari’s wish or need to defend the grammarians’ (Vaiya@karan@as’) view that grammatical expressions are a means of producing (or revealing) religio-spiritual merit. One can see, without straining the mind very much, how grammatical expressions can possibly be instrumental in bestowing social prestige or how they can lead to better employment opportunities. However, connecting grammatical expressions to some kind of other-worldly benefit or psychological transformation invites at least mild disbelief and/or suspicion that the proponent is gullible. Probably for this reason, as well as because of its sweep and extent, the passage has been misinterpreted as advocating an anti-inference, anti-empiricism and anti-rationalism view point or as a typically faith-based Brahmanical response to the logic-loving Buddhists. In the publications listed at the end of this abstract, I have directly or indirectly pointed out the weaknesses of such an interpretation. In the present paper, I will concentrate on analysing the passage itself and pointing out how its elements fit the other concerns of Bhartr@hari as a philosopher-grammarian. When Bhartr@hari advises us not to press logic too far — to leave logic at the door as if it was some footwear, he is in fact establishing that, in some situations, we logically have no alternative and that we need to be sensitive to context, in a linguistic sense as well as in the sense of the whole that a theory forms. This stance may even be said to be the basis of his linguistic approach to philosophical issues.
Note: My thematically related publications: (a) 1971. ‘Nakamura on Bhartr@hari.’ Indo-Iranian Journal 13: 161-75. (b) 1988/89. ‘Pra@ma@n@ya in the philosophy of the Grammarians.’ Studies in Indology: Professor Rasik Vihari Joshi Felicitation Volume, pp.15-28. Eds. Kumar, Avanindra, et al. New Delhi: Shree Publishing House. (c) 1990. ‘The Number of Prama@n@as according to Bhartr@hari.’ Wiener Zeitschrift fu@r die Kunde Su@dasiens 33: 151-58. (d) 1999/2000. ‘The epistemological point of view of Bhartr@hari.’ In Concepts of Knowledge: East and West. Papers from a Seminar held from 4 January to 10 January, 1995, at the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, pp. 1-19. Eds. Swami Prabhananda and J. L. Shaw. Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture. (e) 2001. ‘The word is the world: nondualism in Indian philosophy of language.’ Philosophy East & West 51.4: 452-473. (f) 2004. ‘Can the grammarians’ dharma be a dharma for all?’ Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 687-732.
DAN ARNOLD
(Divinity School, University of Chicago, USA)
On Semantics and Sam@keta: Thoughts on a Neglected Problem with Apoha
The paper argues that apoha doctrine should be understood, most generally, as an attempt at a thoroughly non-intentional account of conceptual thought; that if this is right, then such an account cannot (if it is to succeed) at any stage involve or presuppose an intentional level of description; and that, whether or not the apoha account succeeds at other levels, it is with respect to the formation and acquisition of ‘sam@keta’ that the Buddhist account involves constitutively ‘intentional’ presuppositions. That is, Buddhist accounts of apoha invariably presuppose an already constituted system of linguistic conventions; and in appealing to that system, these accounts typically conflate issues pertaining to the use of these conventions with issues pertaining to the formation and acquisition thereof. In so doing, they overlook the difficulty with giving an account of the origination of conventions. The argument against the Buddhist account thus involves showing that the Buddhists cannot, in fact, give a non-intentional account of the formation and acquisition of linguistic conventions. This argument is developed both with reference to Pu@rva-mi@ma@m@sa@ (in particular, arguments centering on the sambandha@ks@epa-pariha@ra section of the C@loka-va@rttika—and not, as more familiarly, arguments from that text’s explicit treatment of apoha), and with reference to some contemporary arguments against the versions of nominalism that go with cognitive science.
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
(Warsaw University, Poland)
What exists for the Vaic@es@ika?
In his Pada@rtha-dharma-sag@graha, in an often debated phrase s@an@n@a@m api pada@rtha@na@m astitva@bhidheyatva-jj@eyatva@ni, Prac@astapa@da ascribes three properties common to all ontological categories: existentiality, denotability and cognisability. The present paper will take up the question again, whether these three properties are coextensive or not, by supplying some additional material, and will demon-strate how far the issue is related to the idea of omniscience accepted by the Vaic@es@ika.
JOHANNES BRONKHORST
(Universite de Lausanne, Switzerland)
What did Indian Philosophers Believe?
Critics of contemporary fundamentalist Christians tell us that no one took the Biblical creation story literally in pre-modern days. This, if true, raises important questions as to how much Indians, and Indian philosophers in particular, believed of the stories and ideas normally associated with their religions, including their philosophies. Some indications suggest that the situation in classical India (and therefore perhaps in the pre-modern history of Christianity as well) was more complicated than is claimed by those critics.
VINCENT ELTSCHINGER
(Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Austria)
Studies in Dharmaki@rti’s Religious Philosophy: The Cinta@mayi@ Prajj@a@
PETER FLÜGEL
(SOAS, University of London, United Kingdom)
Power and Insight in Jain Discourse
In this paper I propose a theoretical interpretation of syncretic processes as forms of communication, following Habermas’ analysis of latent strategic action. The advantage of this perspective, compared to classical hermeneutics, is that social processes within a religious tradition do not have to be understood in terms of an enactment or actualising appropriation of textual meaning or of rule-specification, but as open historical processes. To the extent that cognition and discourse are historically relevant, the production of social meaning, then, can be understood in terms of the conditions of acceptability of validity claims.
RAGHUNATH GHOSH
(University of North Bengal, Dt. Darjeeling, India)
Can There be unbiased Epistemology in Indian Philosophy?
In this paper an effort is made to show that epistemology (prama@n@a-c@a@stra) as available in Indian philosophical systems is not unbiased, but is vitiated through various metaphysical or ontological presuppositions, though it is claimed by them that through a prama@n@a a prameya is substantiated. Gradually we will see that this principle—‘ma@na@dhi@na meya-siddhi’ is a myth. Because prama@n@a itself is not untouched by the scheme of prameya admitted by them. When a philosopher of a particular school is framing a definition of prama@n@a, it is to some extent ‘subjective’, but not objective in the sense that he bears some presuppositions. The point will be clearer if I put forth some definitions of perception (pratyaks@a) accepted by different systems as an instance. The Naiya@yikas think that the perceptual knowledge is a cognition arising out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object, which cannot be described through language (avyapadec@ya), non-deviated (avyabhica@rin) and non-erroneous (vyavasa@ya@tmaka). To them an object or artha is a kind of category accepted by them and capable of being perceived (yogya). There does not arise any question of perceiving an absurd entity, as the categorical scheme admitted by them does not permit us to do so. Dharmara@ja Adhvari@ndra, a follower of Advaita school, thinks that mere connection (sannikars@a) between sense organ and an object may not be the cause of perceptual cognition. If the whole world is covered by consciousness (caitanya), object (artha) is something covered with this consciousness. These limiting adjuncts (upa@dhis) of one consciousness are called vis@aya-caitanya, prama@n@a-caitanya and prama@tr@-caitanya respectively just as time, though one, has limiting adjuncts (upa@dhis) in the form of hours, days, week, fortnight, month, year etc. After keeping these metaphysical presuppositions in mind Dharmara@ja Adhvari@ndra has accepted two criteria of perceptuality: jj@a@na-gata (perceptuality of knowledge) and vis@aya-gata (perceptuality of object). To him when there is a union between prama@n@a-caitanya (consciousness limited by mental mode – antah@karan@a-vr@tti) and vis@aya-caitanya (consciousness limited by an object), then there is the perceptuality of knowledge (jj@a@na-gata-pratyaks@atva). It is to be borne in mind that they have made a distinction between perception of the knowledge of a jar and perception of a jar. In the case of the perception of the knowledge of a jar there is the union between vis@aya-caitanya and prama@n@a-caitanya but prama@tr@-caitanya will remain isolated. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of object, it should be treated as different from the earlier one. It is not knowledge, which is perceived, but the object only. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known relationship (jj@a@tr@-jj@eya-bha@va). Hence Dharmara@ja Adhvari@ndra says that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of consciousness (prama@tr@-caitanya); but other two i.e. consciousness limited by mental mode (antah@karan@a-vr@tti) and consciousness limited by an object are united in the knower (prama@tr@). It is described by him as ‘prama@tr@-satta@tirikta-satta@katva@bha@va’, i.e. there will be an absence of the existence of other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of prama@tr@ (knower). Herein lies some sort of metaphysical presupposition. In this case Dharmara@ja is dealing with metaphysics in disguise of epistemology. If we turn to the Buddhists in general and Dharmaki@rti in particular, they are also not free from some basic presuppositions like theories of momentariness, dependent origination, causal efficacy (artha-kriya@-ka@ritva) etc. as a characteristic feature of being sat etc. Keeping these in view Dharmaki@rti has formulated the definition of perception as ‘tatra kalpana@pod@ham abhra@ntam pratyaks@am’, i.e. perceptual cognition is the non-erroneous cognition of an entity free from mental ascriptions. Is it not true that such a definition is given keeping some presuppositions in mind? Hence there is hardly anything in different systems of Indian philosophy which may be described as ‘pure epistemology’ or ‘unbiased epistemology’. Indian theories of error called khya@ti-va@da as admitted by different systems are based on purely metaphysical structure. The Vijj@a@na-va@din and C@u@nya-va@din schools of Buddhism propagate a@tma-khyati-va@da and asat-khyati-va@da respectively after keeping the theory of consciousness in the form of Vijj@a@na and C@u@nyata@ in view. Such is the case with the anirvacani@ya-khyati-va@da. In this case the represented object or the mistakenly known object is admitted as different from existent or non-existent (sad-asad-vilaks@an@a), because it (i.e. snake in the case of rope) is neither existent due to its sublation by the latter cognition nor non-existent due to having its apparent awareness (pratibha@sika-satta@). The Mi@ma@m@sakas who do not believe in the existence of erroneous cognition formulates the theory of akhya@ti presupposing it in view. The Naiya@yikas admit that more than one prama@n@a can be applied to know a single object, which is called the theory of prama@n@a-sam@plava. The nature of an object is not a factor for applying prama@n@a. As for example, ‘fire’ can be known through perception, inference or verbal testimony. But so far as the Buddhist view is concerned, a particular nature of an object determines the particular means of knowing (prama@n@a) through which alone it is revealed. An object having a unique characteristic (sva-laks@an@a) is revealed by perception alone. A sva-laks@an@a –entity cannot be revealed by inference and in the same way the sa@ma@nya-laks@an@a entity can be known by inference alone, but not capable of being known by perception. This metaphysical presupposition leads them to admit the system of prama@n@a-vyavastha@. On the basis of the above-mentioned arguments we may come to the conclusion that Indian epistemology is always vitiated by metaphysics.
KENGO HARIMOTO
(Groningen, Holland)
Abandoning Logic, in the case of C@ag@kara
In the history of human intellect, there probably is no better example to illustrate how logic and belief interact (or counteract) than the argument for God. In the sub-commentary on the Yoga-su@tra and the Yoga-bha@s@ya, the Vivaran@a (YVi), the author—most probably C@ag@kara—makes disproportionate effort arguing for the omniscient God. While he uses various types of inference arguing for God, he also relies on revelations, particularly Upanis@ads in the discussion. In contrast, it is well-known that C@ag@kara is known to disregard discussions on epistemology or logic and relies mostly on revelations (Upanis@ads) to promote his position.
Despite the superficial difference between the YVi and other authentic works of C@ag@kara, some striking observations are possible. It is observable that logical arguments in the Vivaran@a have difficulties. Furthermore, the author of the Vivaran@a takes some things for granted under the disguise of being logical, i.e., he believed in them. The difficulties in his logic are acutely pointed out by Man@d@ana Mic@ra in his Vidhi-viveka. Also, the beliefs in the Vivaran@a are also the things C@ag@kara attempts to read in Upanis@ads, often against the immediate context of the text. Again, those were the things C@ag@kara believed. On the other hand, in C@ag@kara’s main writings, even though we do not find arguments for a@tman / brahman / i@c@vara from logical basis, we can observe his awareness of such arguments. Most notable is his awareness of the ontological argument found in the Yoga-bha@s@ya on which the author of the Vivaran@a relies on the most.
Such observations lead me to postulate the followings: 1) the i@c@vara portion of the Vivaran@a can be considered to be by C@ag@kara; 2) the bulk of the Vivaran@a precedes the Brahma-su@tra-bha@s@ya, and as such, characteristic differences between the Vivaran@a and the Brahma-su@tra-bha@s@ya reflect the author’s development; 3) C@ag@kara may have kept revising his works; 4) C@ag@kara was a man of belief rather than a man of logic. These conclusions affirms what Hacker observed about C@ag@kara in certain ways.
TOSHIHIKO KIMURA
(Kyoto University, Japan)
Imperfect Reduction to Absurdity in the Proofs of Indian Metaphysics
Indian philosophers including logicians are said to confuse sometimes contraposition (p>q)<>(-q>-p) with the problem of occurrence and annihilation. That is, they occasionally interpret it as (p>q)<>(-p>-q). The Buddhist causality of 12 topics (12 prati@tya-samutpada@h@) shows a genetic theory of occurrence and annihilation: a>b>c>... ; a>-b>-c>... These relations between positive and negative orders are genetic. Not only Buddhists but Indian philosophers also stood on the basis of causality. But Western classical logicians stand on analytical theory, and modern logicians compose their logic on the set theory. Dharmaki@rti’s theory of svabha@va-hetu corresponds with them.
Indian logic of causality, however, seems to have induced an imperfect reduction to absurdity of naira@tmya-argument in the Pa@li Vinaya, Maha@vagga (=Sam@yutta-nika@ya 57) and the proof of eternal soul by Va@tsya@yana. That is, body is without soul (ru@pam@ ana@tta@), because one cannot control his body at his will, says Gotama. Its logical expression may be thus: p (a@tta) V -p (ana@tta), p>0 (false) .'. -p>1 (true).
The ordinary (anuloma) causality led the annihilation in order (pratiloma). This relation does not mean a logical or analytical change, but a genetic change. Not only Buddhists but early Indian logicians also attached importance to causality. The relation between smoke and fire used frequently as an example of cause and effect is a typical case.
Va@tsya@yana proved the eternality of soul according to an imperfect reduction to absurdity above mentioned, that runs as follows: Soul is eternal (p) or non-eternal (-p). In case it is non-eternal, it would not experience the suffering of metempsychosis. But actually we experience the suffering of metempsychosis (sam@sa@ra). That is -p>0 .'. p>1.
Such logic is applied to sentence logic. In India, the nominal logic was based on the sent theory started from Nya@yasoma commented by Asag@ga (c. 315–385). His theory of syllogism was improved to two premises and one conclusion by Dharmaki@rti (c. 550-620). But before him Nya@yasoma and Digna@ga knew the logical relation between probans (p) and probandum (q) to be (p>q)<>(-q>-p). Furthermore Dharmaki@rti proved the authenticity of reason (p) for conclusion (q) by correct reduction to absurdity: (p>-q)>-p. This is seen in his Va@da-nya@ya.
HORST LASIC
(Österreichische Akademie der Wisssenschaften, Austria)
A hot dispute about lukewarm air: Digna@ga on a@pta-va@da
Buddhism has often been associated with both a strong leaning towards rationality as well as a high esteem for and a strong belief in the words of the Buddha. These two features might be regarded as indicating attitudes that seem to be incompatible and therefore one might feel the need of a justification. Within the Buddhist prama@n@a tradition the relation between empirically gained knowledge and knowledge based on the words of the Buddha is a recurrent theme. The passage constantly referred to in this connection is Dharmaki@rti’s Prama@n@a-va@rttika-svavr@tti 108ff, where the statements of a trustworthy person (a@pta-va@da) are given the status of a source of correct knowledge. An interesting point is that the statements of a trustworthy person have been classified as a sort of inference, and even the status of inference has been accepted only because there is no other way to enable the Buddhist practice. However, Dharmaki@rti’s discussion in the Prama@n@a-va@rttika-svavr@tti takes as its starting point Digna@ga’s Prama@n@a-samuccaya 2.5ab. Since a number of different interpretations of this passage have been put forward, the present paper will investigate this line of verse and its original context.
PHILIPP A. MAAS
(University of Bonn, Germany and Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna)
Valid Knowledge and Belief in Classical Sa@m@khya-Yoga
The Pa@taj@jala-yoga-c@a@stra (i.e. the Yoga-su@tra together with its oldest commentary, the so-called Yoga-bha@s@ya) is known to accept three means to gain valid knowledge (prama@n@as): direct perception, inference and verbal testimony / authoritative tradition. Among these, direct perception (pratyaks@a) is regarded as the most important. It is not only said to be the ‘source’ of inference (anuma@na) and of verbal testimony (a@gama), but also to be outside the scope of possible alternations or corrections by means of the remaining two prama@n@as. In the context of yogic meditation this primacy is stressed in connection with metaphysical / ontological truth. The ontological inventory of Sa@m@khya-Yoga becomes directly perceptible in yogic meditation and, therefore, truly exist. This kind of perception is the fulfilment of the teachings of authoritative tradition, the truth of which is a matter of belief (c@raddha@), up to its realisation in yogic meditation. ‘Belief’, therefore, can be regarded as acceptance of valid knowledge, which a qualified practitioner can prove by means of direct perception.
The paper will present a detailed exposition of this outline—drawing mainly upon the new critical edition of the first chapter of the Pa@taj@jala-yoga-c@a@stra—highlighting philosophical tensions, problems, and more or less apparent inconsistencies.
HIROSHI MARUI
(the University of Tokyo, Japan)
Considering the ‘six tarkas’ in the Nya@ya-maj@jari@
Jayanta refers to the set of six tarkas (s@at@-tarki@) in the introductory passage of his Nya@ya-maj@jari@. With reference to this sixfold division of tarka, I will discuss the following problems:
1. What does he mean by that? — There were two interpretations. V. N. Jha (1995) interprets the ‘s@at@-tarki@’ as the Vaic@es@ika-system in the form of S@at@-tarki@, assuming that the six tarkas are Vaic@es@ika’s six pada@rthas. According to U. Mishra (1936) & (1957) and Ganganatha Jha (1942), on the other hand, the ‘six tarkas’ are the ‘tarkas’ (logics or systems) of Naiya@yikas, Sa@m@khyas, Mi@ma@m@sakas, Jainas, Bauddhas and Ca@rva@kas. But a close study of the passage shows that neither of the two interpretations is wrong. The correct answer is obtained by replacing Mi@ma@m@sakas with Vaic@es@kas in the latter list.
2. Are there any other parallels to this concept? — Yes. One instance occurs in the introductory portion of the Ka@vya-mi@ma@m@sa@ by Ra@jac@ekara, a contemporary rhetorician of Jayanta’s. There the same six are called ‘s@at@ tarka@˙’. A dictionary of synonyms, Abhidha@na-cinta@man@i, written by a famous Jaina scholar Hemacandra, supplies a corresponding sixfold group of ‘logicians’ (s@at@ ta@rkika@˙).
3. It is not easy to decide whether there is any important relation between the ‘six tarkas’ and the corresponding ‘six darc@anas’. But it will be worth while to make a further study.
4. Finally, I will relate these considerations with the main theme of this Seminar.
SHUJUN MOTEGI
(Shinshu University, Nagano, Japan)
Early Concepts of Logic in the Sa@m@khya
The Sa@m@khya, the earliest system of Indian philosophical thought, proposed a new path to emancipation on the basis of dualism, which distinguishes spirit (purus@a) from materiality (prakr@ti), by denying traditional ways to achieve emancipation. As the concept of materiality, prakr@ti, is unique to the Sa@m@khya, this system needed to prove its existence to other schools of philosophical thought. For this purpose, the early Sa@m@khya must have established a certain methodical and logical way of reasoning. Prof. Frauwallner, in his article ‘Die Erkentnislehre des klassischen Sa@m@khya-Systems’ (WZKSO 2, 1958), by examining the Prama@na-samuccaya of Digna@ga and its commentary by Jinendrabuddhi and other texts, has shown that, in the no-longer-extant S@as@t@i-tantra ascribed to Va@rsaganya, two kinds of syllogism called vi@ta-avi@ta (or a@vi@ta) have been used. The early Sa@m@khya used a five member syllogism called vi@ta-avi@ta to demonstrate the existence of prakr@ti. The terms vi@ta-avi@ta are again defined in the Nya@ya-bha@sya. This reflects the widespread usage of this concept at a certain period in the early history of Indian logic. The concept of vi@ta-avi@ta still has some unclear points that require re-examination. The Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@ follows on from the three kinds of inference from the S@as@t@i-tantra, namely, pu@rvavat, c@es@avat, sa@ma@nyato-dr@s@t@a which are mentioned in the Nya@ya-bha@sya, too. But it did not refer to the syllogism at all. Is there any good reason for the author of the Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@ to ignore the concept of the syllogism of vi@ta-avi@ta? In this paper on the basis of re-examination of the concept of inference and syllogism of the Sa@m@khya, I shall discuss the following points: (1) What is the difference in the concept of inference between S@as@t@i-tantra and Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@, (2) Is there any relation between anuma@na and syllogism in the earlier and later stages of development of the Sa@m@khya theory, (3) Is the vi@ta-avi@ta syllogism applied solely to prove the existence of prakr@ti or to prove anything in general, and finally (4) What is the meaning of the appearance of the terms vi@ta-avi@ta in the Yukti-di@pika, a commentary on the Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@ in which those terms do not appear?
KASHINATH NYAUPANE
(Mahendra Sanskrit University, Kathmandu, Nepal)
God in Mi@ma@m@sa@ philosophy
Presentation of a work in 100 verses in Sanskrit, the Ic@va@ra-nira@sa-ka@rika@, being a refutation of god in the Mi@ma@m@sa@ philosophy.
CLAUS OETKE
(Stockholm Universitet, Sweden)
Prama@n@a, Belief and Decision
The theory of prama@n@a has been connected with different topics in the Indian tradition, in particular 1) the adoption of beliefs, 2) the attainment of interpersonal agreement and 3) the making of practical decisions. Due to the lack of explicit accounts of the interconnections between the mentioned topics in the textual sources it is incumbent on the interpreter to explore the manner in which those issues are objectively related. On this basis it is possible to demonstrate that the topics 1) – 3) are connected by the relation of a ‘family resemblance’, such that a link between the issues 1) and 2) can be established via the notion of a second order belief (a belief about beliefs) whereas 1) and 3) can be brought into connection by the idea of the assignment of probabilities to propositions. Exactly those notions reveal two facts about Indian theories of prama@n@a, viz. a) the conceptions underlying those theories are too restricted and one-sided, b) the entire theoretical framework in which theories of prama@n@a have been embedded is too narrow. An important reason for the deficiency is that a theory of rational decisions and success of practice in the social sphere requires as a component an account of the manner in which beliefs are de facto adopted by people.
STEPHEN PHILLIPS
(The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, USA)
Sensitivity to defeaters (ba@dhaka) as intrinsic
to knowledge of inference-warranting concomitance (vya@pti)
This paper explores the concept of anuma@na@bha@sa (comprising hetva@bha@sa, upa@dhi, and other inferential defeaters), contending that correct extrapolation, according to Gag@gec@a and his followers, envelopes a sensitivity to the major patterns of pseudo-inference. Thus in an epistemology usually counted externalist for its denial of Kp > KKp and of knowledge requiring ‘conscious justification,’ there is a glaring internalist element, a requirement to examine putative inferences to make sure they are upa@dhi-frei (nirupa@dhikatva). This is reminiscent of Descartes and Socrates. This paper shows, in particular, that the metaphysically prominent inference pattern of the ‘negative-only’ (kevala-vyatireky-anuma@na) depends on internalist criteria.
KARL POTTER
(University of Washington, USA)
Should Dharmaki@rti have given in so easily to Yoga@ca@ra?
The philosophical position of Digna@ga and Dharmaki@rti is plausibly construed as an attempt to retain, as far as is consistent with Buddhism, a brand of Sautra@ntika realism. But ultimately Dharmaki@rti appears to accept idealism on at least two critical issues: the idealist denial of the mind-independent existence of wholes and of spatio-temporally extended entities other than sense-data. I argue that the reasons that led him to proceed down the slippery slope to Yoga@ca@ra idealism, rather than to retreat to, e.g., Nya@ya-Vaic@es@ika realism, on these points are not as compelling as he seems to have thought, since he appears willing to countenance as real not only sva-laks@an@as but their perceptual ‘aspects’ (a@ka@ra) as well.
TAISEI SHIDA
(Doctoral Candidate of Tokyo University, Japan)
On the Distribution of Validity and Invalidity at the Origination of Cognition:
What is the ‘General Cause of Cognition’ and the ‘Causal factor for Validity’?
In Indian philosophy, polemicists argue about a topic called pra@ma@n@ya-va@da, or the theory of truth or justification. Under this topic, they mainly argue about whether such properties of cognitions as its validity and invalidity are intrinsic (svatah@) or adventitious (paratah@).
In the C@loka-va@rttika, Kuma@rila analyses this topic systematically for the first time. In the later period, the intrinsic and adventitious character of both properties are analysed from several aspects. There are at least three aspects as follows: (1) utpatti, or the origination of validity and invalidity, (2) jj@apti, or the way how to justify cognition, and (3) pravr@tti, or the way how cognition operates. In earlier texts of Mi@ma@m@sa@ such as the C@loka-va@rttika, the plurality of aspects mentioned above are not distinguished; instead Kuma@rila argues the matter in a general and unspecified way.
In this paper, I will focus on the aspect of utpatti, or origination. The point that differentiates the svatah@ theory and paratah@ theory with respect to the origination is what the causal factor for the validity and invalidity is. In other words, it concerns the question what the causal factor for the validity is: is it non-existence of fault (dos@a@bha@va) or causal excellence (gun@a)?
UNO (1963) posed two problems regarding the paratah@ theory of the utpatti aspect. First, is it the case that the general cause of cognition produces a cognition independently, namely without either gun@a or dos@a? Second, what do the ‘general cause of cognition (*jj@a@na-ka@ran@a-ma@tra)’ and the ‘causal excellence (gun@a)’ concretely mean, especially for the Naiya@yika.
In this paper, first I will focus on the point of difference between the paratah@ theory of the Naiya@yika and the svatah@ theory of the Mi@ma@m@saka. Then, mainly using the texts of both schools, such as the C@loka-va@rttika and commentaries thereon etc., which assert svatah@ theory, and the Nya@ya-maj@jari@, the Nya@ya-bhu@s@ana, the Nya@ya-kusuma@j@jali, and the Tattva-cinta@-man@i etc. which assert paratah@ theory, I will examine the two problems posed by UNO (1963), from a historical viewpoint.
As a conclusion, I try to demonstrate how the pra@ma@n@ya-va@da on utpatti aspect has been connected with the issue of the definition of prama@n@a. In addition, I will also try to show that the interpretation of the gun@a has changed in the Nya@ya school and that the Nya@ya-kusuma@j@jali is situated at the turning point of such a shift in the interpretation of gun@a.
Incidentally, both the Mi@ma@m@saka and the Naiya@yika admit the authority of the Veda. Nevertheless, they stand in opposition as to whether the Vedic scripture has its origin in the beginningless eternal words themselves or whether it is composed by God. Against this background, it seems that polemicists need to take it into account when they argue about the pra@ma@n@ya-va@da also, namely when they address the issue whether the causal factor for validity is dos@a@bha@va or gun@a.
When the theistic tendency gradually increases in the Nya@ya school, in his chief literary work the Nya@ya-kusuma@j@jali, the main topic of which is the proof of the existence of God, Udayana argues about the pra@ma@n@ya-va@da in the second chapter. There Udayana mentions both aspects of utpatti and jj@apti, and subsequently concentrates on the aspect of utpatti.
FERNANDO TOLA and CARMEN DRAGONETTI
(National Council for Scientific Research,
Institute of Buddhist Studies Foundation, Argentina)
The distinction in intellectu / in re in the ontological proof and in Bhartr@hari
The article starts presenting the famous ‘ontological proof’ of the existence of God imagined by Saint Anselm, which pretends to derive the real existence of God from His mere notion. Then the article develops the refutation of that proof by Gaunilo, Saint Thomas and Kant. The refutation of the proof is based on the opposition between an existence in intellect (in intellectu) and an existence in reality (in re), and in the impossibility of passing from one type of existence to the other without an appropriate demonstration. The article then points out the same opposition and the same impossibility maintained by the Indian philosopher Bhartr@hari in his Va@kyapadi@ya. If Saint Anselm’s ontological proof is applied to the Hindu belief of the existence of Vis@n@u or C@iva, conceived as the most perfect being, then their real existence must be admitted. This is a necessary conclusion that could only produce serious worry to Western philosophers, among whom this proof has always enjoyed of a great valuation.
JOHN VATTANKY, S. J.
(De Nobili College, Pune, India)
Theism: The Culmination of Nya@ya Logic
It is argued first of all that theism is the culmination of Nya@ya in an extrinsic sense. In the course of the development of the Nya@ya system outstanding authors of the school have produced philosophical arguments or works either as part of larger treatises or as independent monographs on the subject of God.
In a more important sense I argue that the principles of Nya@ya logic leads intrinsically to theism. In the Tattva-cinta@-man@i (TCM), the basic text of Navya-nya@ya, Gag@gec@a begins the i@svara-va@da section stating that only on the basis of the logic developed by him in the earlier parts of the work, the existence of God can be established. Implied in this statement is the idea that according to Gag@gec@a the connection between the treatise on inference in general and the inference of God is much more than casual. It is only on the basis of the nature of inference as explained in the earlier section of TCM, that it is possible to prove the existence of God. Implied also is the rejection of the position of Buddhists and others according to whose logic it would be impossible to prove the existence of God. Viewed in this perspective the nature of logic as developed by Gag@gec@a leads to and culminates in theism.
