The Seminar will focus on various aspects of Indian logic and philosophy, with special emphasis on patterns on reasoning, strategies of arguing and formal proof procedure in Indian philosophy. The seminar will also become a forum for a discussion pertaining to such questions as whether the concept of syllogism can justifiably be regarded to corresponds to Indian formal proof procedures, how we can symbolise an Indian patterns of reasoning, etc. The papers delivered at the Seminar will be published as a special issue of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, which is presently the most important journal on Indian philosophy in the world.
We have received positive response from world leading scholars in the field of Indian studies and logic. The list of participants include such eminent scholars as John D. Dunne (Wisconsin-Madison), Eli Franco (Vienna), Jonardon Ganeri (Cambridge), Brendan Gillon (Montreal), Edeltraud Harzer (Austin, Texas), Harunaga Isaacson (Hamburg), Takashi Iwata (Tokyo), Kei Kataoka (Tokyo), Kyo Kano (Kobe / Vienna), Shoryu Katsura (Hiroshima), Birgit Kellner (Vienna), Helmut Krasser (Vienna), Horst Lasic (Vienna), Hiroshi Marui (Tokyo University), Claus Oetke (Stockholm), Parimal Patil (Atlanta), Ole Holten Pind (Copenhagen), Ernst Prets (Vienna), Ferenc Ruzsa (Budapest), Mark Siderits (Illinois), Fujinaga Sin (Miyazaki), Ernst Steinkellner (Vienna), Albrecht Wezler (Hamburg). Please note that the list of papers is already closed.
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| Conference Hall | ||
| 21.06, Thursday: | 14.00-18.00 | afternoon session (3 papers) |
| 20.00 | cultural programme | |
| 22.06, Friday: | 10.00-13.00 | morning session |
| 14.00 | additional programme (sight-seeing tour, etc.) | |
| 23.06, Saturday: | 10.00-13.00 | morning session |
| 14.00 | additional programme (sight-seeing tour, etc.) |
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| Kazimierz Dolny | ||
Seminar fee for participants who do not present a paper: 50 z³oty (students: free). The fee allows to participate in the sessions of the seminar only. The fee does not cover any accommodation, meals, transportation, conference materials or participation in additional programme (e.g. envisaged sight-seeing tours, etc.). The number of hearers is very limited. Please contact us (mejor@orient.uw.edu.pl, piotr@orient.uw.edu.pl) as early as possible if you wish to participate as a hearer.
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| Kazimierz Dolny | ||
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21.06.2001 (Thursday) - 14.00-18.15 - INAUGURATION &
AFTERNOON SESSIONS
9.00-11.30: bus transfer from Warsaw to the Seminar venue (KazimierzDolny)
13.00-14.00: lunch
14.00-14.30: Inauguration
MAREK MEJOR: Contribution of Polish scholars to the study of Indian
logic
14.30-16.00: session 1:
14.30-15.00: paper 1: SHORYU KATSURA: Vasubandhu's Proofs in the Abhidharma-kos%a
15.00-15.30: paper 2: ERNST STEINKELLNER: Once More on Circles
15.30-16.00: discussion
16.00-16.15: tea break
16.15-18.15: session 2:
16.15-16.45: paper 1: ELI FRANCO: Fragments of Buddhist Logic from
the Kusa@n@a Period
16.45-17.15: paper 2: PARIMAL PATIL: Intentionality and Conceptual
Content in Late Buddhist Epistemology
17.15-17.45: paper 3: JONARDON GANERI: Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory
of Case-Based Reasoning
17.45-18.15: discussion
18.15-19.15: dinner
19.30-21.00: cultural programme: bonfire party and Polish folk band
at the Kazimierz Dolny castle ruins
22.06.2001 (Friday) - 9.00-13.00 - MORNING SESSIONS
7.30- 9.00: breakfast
9.00-11.00: session 3:
9.00- 9.30: paper 1: JOHN D. DUNNE: Yet Again on Svabha@va-pratibandha:
Some Ontological Questions
9.30-10.00: paper 2: TAKASHI IWATA: An interpretation of Dharmaki@rti's
svabha@va-hetu
10.00-10.30: paper 3: BIRGIT KELLNER: Still more on anupalabdhi-hetu
- resolved issues and open questions
pertaining to Dharmaki@rti's third logical reason
10.30-11.00: discussion
11.00-11.15: tea break
11.15-13.15: session 4:
11.15-11.45: paper 1: EDELTRAUD HARZER: The Reason for Yukti
11.45-12.15: paper 2: FERENC RUZSA: Inference, reasoning and causality
in the Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@
12.15-12.45: paper 3: HORST LASIC: On the Utilization of Causality
as a basis of Inference - Dharmaki@rti's
Statements and Their Interpretation
12.45-13.15: discussion
13.15-14.00: lunch
14.00-19.30: excursion 1: Janowiec Castle, cruise on the Vistula river
19.30-20.30: dinner
23.06.2001 (Saturday) - 9.00-13.15 - MORNING SESSION
7.30- 9.00: breakfast
9.00-11.00: session 5:
9.00- 9.30: paper 1: BRENDAN S. GILLON: Notation and Reason in Early
Classical India
9.30-10.00: paper 2: CLAUS OETKE: Limitations of Theories of Prama@n@a
10.00-10.30: paper 3: MARK SIDERITS: Inductive, Deductive, Both, or
Neither?
10.30-11.00: discussion
11.00-11.15: tea break
11.15-13.15: session 6:
11.15-11.45: paper 4: KEI KATAOKA: The Mi@ma@m@sa@ Definition of Prama@n@a
as a Source of New Information
11.45-12.15: paper 5: HELMUT KRASSER: On the Ascertainment of Validity
12.15-12.45: paper 6: ERNST PRETS: Parley, Reason and Rejoinder
12.45-13.15: discussion
13.15-14.00: lunch
23.06.2001 (Saturday ) - 14.00-16.30 - AFTERNOON SESSION
14.00-16.30: session 6:
14.00-14.30: paper 1: HIROSHI MARUI: A Study of lig@gapara@mars%a:
exploring into
the presuppositions of the Indian Logic
14.30-15.00: paper 2: PIOTR BALCEROWICZ: Is 'inexplicability otherwise'
otherwise explicable?
15.00-15.30: paper 3: OLE HOLTEN PIND: Did Digna@ga and Mallava@din
know the Old Va@kya-padi@ya-vr@tti?
15.30-16.00: paper 4: FUJINAGA SIN: Samantabhadra, Siddhasena and Akala@gka
(read in absentia)
16.00-16.30: discussion
17.00-19.30: excursion 2: horse carriage sight-seeing tour around Kazimierz
Dolny
19.30-21.00: dinner and cultural programme
24.06.2001 (Sunday) - 9.00-11.30 - RETURN TO
WARSAW
7.30- 9.00: breakfast
9.00: departure to Warsaw
11.30: arrival to Warsaw:
arrival point: University Hotel 'Hera'
ul. Belwederska 26/30, 00-594 Warszawa
tel.: +48 (22) 55 31 000 (reception desk)
+48 (22) 85 15 138 (booking)
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Yet Again on Svabha@vapratibandha: Some Ontological Questions
John Dunne
This paper focuses on Dharmaki@rti's notion of svabha@va-pratibandha,
especially as presented in his Prama@n@a-va@rttika-svm@pajn%a-vr@tti, with
some attention to parallel discussion in his other works. In an attempt
to improve and clarify what I have previously discussed (1999; UMI # 9936196),
I focus upon the ta@da@tmya mode, and I begin by asking why ta@da@tmya
cannot be fully explained in terms of mere ontological reduction, i.e.,
the ontological identity of sa@dhya and sa@dhana. Here, Dharmaki@rti's
discussion of fruits on a branch (PVSV on PV1.18ab; Gnoli 12.14-25) will
serve as our most obvious example. By inquiring into what we most supply
beyond mere ontological reduction to explain the logical validity of reasoning
based upon ta@da@tmya, our discussion will next raise the crucial role
that apoha plays in the formulation of svabha@va in both of its senses.
Examining apoha in this context will oblige us to recall the ontological
presuppositions involved, and we will illustrate these presuppositions
by discussing pratiniyata-s%akti and sa@ma@nya-s%akti in relation to apoha
(PVSV on PV1.137-142; Gnoli 66.14-69.8). With all this in mind, I will
attempt to demonstrate how we can supplement mere ontological reduction
in at least some forms of valid reasoning based upon ta@da@tmya.
Fragments of Buddhist Logic from the Kus@a!n@a Period
Eli Franco (Vienna)
The Spitzer-Manuscript (SHT-810), the earliest philosophical manuscript
in Sanskrit that was recovered by the Turfan expeditions, contains a large
number of fragments, mostly very small ones, that deal with the topic of
debate (vaada). In my paper I will attempt to arrange some of these in
a meaningful order and to determine their place within the manuscript.
My hypothesis is that (approximately) folios 398-416 of the original manuscript
contained a section on debate that is similar to the *Upaayah.rdaya (attributed
to Naagaarjuna).
Notation and Reason in Early Classical India
Brendan S. Gillon (Montreal)
The paper addresses the question: what are the advantages and disadvantages
of using notation in setting out what philosophers in classical India had
to say about reason? The paper argues that, while notation allows one to
abstract the relevant form of reason studied, it risks misleading us about
the nature of their enterprise. The paper argues that their enterprise
was not an enterprise of logic but an enterprise of ontology, epistemology
and dialectics.
The Reason for Yukti
Edeltraud Harzer (Austin, Texas)
In order to gain a better understanding of such terms as yukti, we need
to explore early s%a@straic works. Such works, some medical, others on
polity, though not at all philosophical, are still of a theoretical nature.
One of the main sources for this study of yukti is the Caraka-sam@hita@.
There are also pertinent references in the Aitareya-bra@hman@a and Sus%ruta-sam@hita@.
Yukti was one of the four cornerstones for expounding a theoretical system.
The others are what we call prama@n@as: verbal authority, perception and
inference. Apart from this, we also find more detailed sets of features
which make a given theoretical work rigorous in its analytical approach.
Here yukti acquired yet another meaning. Many of the early theoretical
works shared a common ideology. This analytical and conceptual theory relied
on the Sa@m@khya teachings. There is no independent early work of Sa@m@khya.
Only centuries later during the classical period, a mnemonic text, the
Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@ summarised newly systematised theories together with
earlier doctrines. One of the commentaries, the Yukti-di@pika@, discusses
the tantra-gun@as, the term appears to be a synonym for tantra-yuktis.
I shall discuss to what extent yukti can become a formal argument. The
question is whether yukti just facilitates a further search for a better
and more complete analytical method. Here yukti loosely refers to building
an argument in support of a claim, or implies that a presentation of the
material is arranged in a reasonably logical way. Thus yukti endorses a
certain piece of writing as proper theory. In this paper I shall examine
what other kinds of application yukti had as well as how diversified its
purpose was. I shall also speculate on why we do not witness a similar
practice in later works and therefore lack an explanation of its earlier
uses.
An interpretation of Dharmaki@rti's svabha@vahetu
Takashi IWATA (Tokyo)
One of contributions of Dharmaki@rti to Buddhist logic consists in his
reinterpretation of Digna@ga's logic by means of the ontological relation
"essential connection" (svabha@vapratibandha), i.e. ta@da@tmya, the relation
that the sa@dhana (proving factor) is the self of the sa@dhya (factor to
be proved), and tadutpatti, the relation that the sa@dhana is the effect
of the sa@dhya. On the ground of this essential connection, he restricts
all valid reasons basically to two kinds: svabha@vahetu and ka@ryahetu.
The validity of the logical relation between the svabha@vahetu and its
consequence, a property to be proved (sa@dhyadharma), is based on the ontological
relation of ta@da@tmya, while that of the logical relation between ka@ryahetu
and aproperty to be proved is based on the ontological relation of tadutpatti.
In spite of the important role of the svabha@vapratibandha to guarantee
the validity of inferential relation in the sphere of real things, in the
case of the svabha@vahetu the dynamic interpretation of ta@da@tmya is not
clearly given. Namely, in contrast to the well known relation of cause
and effect, which is the basis for the establishment of the inferential
relation between ka@ryahetu and its consequence, the relation of ta@da@tmya,
probably because of its static feature, does not seem to be self-evident
when the question arises as to how it appears concretely in the sphere
of real things. The present paper aims to illustrate the dynamic feature
of the ta@da@tmya from the aspect of the causal relation of real things
and their own material causes.
Although Dharmaki@rti's interpretation of inferential relation by means
of the minimal principle of the svabha@vapratibandha is systematically
so simplified that it makes us possible to grasp the general scheme of
his logic, just because of this very simplicity the validity of his logical
system is called into question: how is it possible to interpret arbitrary
valid reasons only on the basis of either ta@da@tmya or tadutpatti; in
other words, how are valid reasons reduced to either svabha@vahetu or ka@ryahetu?
I have treated some of these problems elsewhere. Among the problems
arising in connection with the validity of the svabha@vapratibandha, those
with respect to the tadutpatti are relatively easy to solve, because the
transformation of causality into this logical relation is widely known:
there is no effect without cause, namely, whenever there is an effect,
there is a cause. To the contrary, in the case of the interpretation of
svabha@vahetu on the basis of the ta@da@tmya one encounters a problem of
how to establish the logical pervasion of the svabha@vahetu by its consequence,
but not the contrary pervasion of the consequence by the svabha@vahetu,
because the ontological relation of ta@da@tmya implies the factual identity
of sa@dhana and sa@dhya, and hence the transformation of the ontological
relation of ta@da@tmya to the logical relation is not so clear as in the
case of the causality. The present paper deals with the problem whether
the difference between the two types of the svabha@vahetu, namely, the
second and the eighth type of reason in Digna@ga's Hetucakra, can be explained
by the ta@da@tmya; if not, what conditions are to be presupposed.
The Mi@ma@m@sa@ Definition of Prama@n@a as a Source of New Information
Kei Kataoka (Tokyo)
Katsura [1984], discussing Dharmaki@rti's theory of truth, contrasts
two points of view as relevant for Dharmaki@rti's criteria of prama@n@a,
namely, "pragmatic" and "epistemological" ones. As for the former "pragmatic"
point of view, besides Dharmaki@rti's first definition prama@n@am avisam@va@di
jn%a@nam, he comments on the second definition ajn%a@ta@rtha-praka@s%o
va@ as follows:
"Furthermore, according to Dharmaki@rti, the object of prama@n@a should
be something new. This idea is probably derived from a sort of common sense
belief that knowledge is meaningless unless it contains some new information.
... The definition of prama@n@a so far discussed can be called 'the pragmatic
criterion of prama@n@a' of Dharmaki@rti." (Katsura [1984:224])
Besides "epistemological" correspondence with an object, being a source
of new information is an important characteristic of prama@n@a, not only
for Dharmaki@rti, but also for Kuma@rila, a contemporary Mi@ma@m@saka,
probably a bit senior to Dharmaki@rti as Frauwallner suggests. In fact
this has been so in the Mi@ma@m@sa@ tradition even before Kuma@rila, while
in the Buddhist tradition this aspect is not found before Dharmaki@rti.
It is therefore necessary to reconsider what the origin of this idea
may have been, and to examine whether Dharmaki@rti may have borrowed it
from the Mi@ma@m@sa@. This paper will attempt to shed light on these questions
mainly by examining the historical and theoretical development of the idea
within the Mi@ma@m@sa@ tradition.
Katsura, Shoryu [1984] "Dharmaki@rti's Theory of Truth." Journal of
Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 215-235.
Vasubandhu's Proofs in the Abhidharmakos%a
Shoryu Katsura (Hiroshima)
The aim of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu's doctrinal proofs found
in the Abhidharmakos%a. I shall try to place and evaluate Vasubandhu's
logical arguments in the history of Indian logic. I shall discuss two sets
of proofs; namely, a proof of 'All exists' (sarva@stiva@da) and that of
'Momentariness' (ks@an@abhag@ga). In the former, Vasubandhu presents the
proof from the Sarva@stiva@da-Vaibha@s@ika standpoint. First he refers
to two passages from the Buddhist scriptures which seem to indicate that
the Buddha accepted the reality of the past and the future dharmas. Then
he gives a certain logical reasoning in order to prove the reality of those
dharmas. In short, Vasubandhu at least in this context tries to make his
point by referring to a@gama (scripture) as well as resorting to yukti
(reasoning). Vasubandhu's reasoning consists of anvaya and vyatireka; namely,
when there is an object, there is a cognition, and when there is no object,
there is no cognition. From this the Vaibha@s@ikas assume that there is
no cognition which has no objective support in reality (nira@lambana-vijn%a@na).
Thus one can conclude that as long as there is a cognition of either the
past or the future dharmas, there exist the past or the future dharmas.
Vasubandhu presents two proofs of momentariness from the Sautra@ntika
standpoint. The first proof corresponds to what is known as vina@s%itva@numa@na
by the later Buddhist logicians. Cessation (vina@s%a), being absence, cannot
expect any cause; hence, it is the essential nature of dharmas; consequently,
all conditioned (sam@skr@ta) dharmas are subject to momentary cessation.
The second proof is a kind of prasag@ga argument which supplements the
first proof. If we assume that cessation expects some cause, such as a
hammer, then all conditioned dharmas cease to exist due to some cause;
but there are well-acknowledged momentary beings, such as a cognition,
sound, and a flame; therefore, the first assumption is not true and cessation
does not expect any extraneous cause. From a purely logical point of view,
Vasubandhu's second proof has some problem. Nonetheless, it is interesting
to note that he too has to rely on prasag@ga argument in order to prove
the thesis like 'Universal Momentariness'.
Still more on anupalabdhi-hetu - resolved issues and open questions
pertaining to Dharmaki@rti's third logical reason
Birgit Kellner (Vienna)
This paper, which has the character of a survey over my ongoing research
on anupalabdhi, aims to draw attention to certain salient features of Buddhist
logicians' exposition of the third logical reason in Dharmaki@rti's system.
These 'salient features' can be broadly classified into two types:
a) Historically uncontroversial, but otherwise unclear features: These
are features regarding which no, or no significant, disagreement exists
within the Buddhist logical tradition, but for which no, or no satisfactory,
scholarly interpretation has been produced so far. Such features are, amongst
others, the subsumption of non-cognition under the reason of essential
property (svabha@va-hetu) because of its reliance on identity (ta@da@tmya)
as an inferential relation, the claim that non-cognition does not establish
absence (abha@va) per se, but the conceptual, linguistic, and physical
treatment of an object as absent (abha@va-vyavaha@ra), the discussion about
a proper example (dr@st@a@nta) in inferences based on non-cognition, and
the distinction between numerous sub-types of non-cognition.
b) Historically controversial features: These are features regarding
which there exists disagreement within the Buddhist logical tradition,
even though the scope and implications of such disagreement remains often
unclear. Such features are, amongst others, the discussion about whether
negative cognition is always the result of an inferential process or whether
it cannot in some cases also be the result of perception, or the discussion
about whether inferences based on non-cognition are universally restricted
to cases where both the subject of the inference and the negatum are objects
of the same type of sense-perception, like for instance visual perception
(i.e. the discussion about the concept eka-jn%a@na-sam@sarga).
By drawing attention to these features, I aim to show on the one hand
where prevalent opinions about non-cognition are to be corrected and to
indicate on the other hand questions that remain to be solved through future
research in this and related areas.
On the Ascertainment of Validity
Helmut Krasser
rNgog Lotsa@ba Blo ldan shes rab's classification of certain cognitions
as cognitions where the validity is ascertained on account of that cognition
itself (rang las, svatah@) and of others where the validity is known due
to another one (gzhan las, paratah@) has been strongly opposed by Sa skya
pan@d@ita. This has been shown in a recent (1992) paper by Ernst Steinkellner.
Taking the controversy between the followers of these two teachers as a
starting point, the paper aims at tracing back their ideas to their Indian
sources.
ON THE UTILIZATION OF CAUSALITY AS A BASIS OF INFERENCE - DHARMAKI@RTI'S STATEMENTS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
Horst Lasic (Vienna)
As it is the case with all historically relevant results of creative
activity, Dharmaki@rti's achievements in the field of logic are to
a significant degree due to his masterly blending of ideas both old and
new. He had the gift to not only thoroughly realize the tools of his predecessors,
but also to combine those that he deemed useful with his own unique inventions.
This his ability helped him create an edifice of ideas that no Indian philosopher
of the next few centuries was able to neglect. Some of his procedures became
standard models for his followers, and some were taken over with certain
modifications even by his opponents. However, his abundant works also contain
ideas that seem to have found neither response nor curiosity within the
Indian logical tradition. The importance of these neglected ideas should
not be underestimated by the historian of Indian philosophy, since in many
cases the disregard of some ideas is as telling as the consideration of
some other ideas.
This paper concentrates on those statements in which Dharmaki@rti for
the first time elaborates on causality as a basis of inference. Special
attention is devoted to methodological aspects. The results of the analysis
of the passages in question are contrasted and compared with their reception
on the part of subsequent generations of Indian philosophers.
A Study of lig@gapara@mars%a: exploring into the presuppositions of the Indian Logic
Hiroshi Marui
I am going to talk on the concept of lig@gapara@mars%a, one of the terms
peculiar to Nya@ya Logic. The chief text material is a passage
from Jayanta's Nya@yaman%jari@ which deals with the controversy between
a@ca@rya@h@ and vya@khya@t@rah@ on the perceptual and inferential process(es).
Limitations of Theories of Prama@n@a
Claus Oetke (Stockholm)
The paper points out a number of phenomena which are not only relevant
for epistemological questions but are either explicitly mentioned or indirectly
alluded to in works of the Indian philosophical or non-philosophical literature.
I try to show that these phenomena have not been properly accounted for
in Indian epistemological theories and suggest that the omissions indicate
"social" features of philosophical practice which are detrimental to theoretical
progress.
Intentionality and Conceptual Content in Late Buddhist Epistemology:
Apoha in the Ratnaki@rtinibandha@vali
Parimal G. Patil (Atlanta, Ga.)
This paper provides an interpretation of Ratnaki@rti's theory
of exclusion [apoha] by arguing that it is best interpreted as a theory
of conceptual content; that is, as a theory of what our words and thoughts
are about and what our bodily activity is directed towards. In
interpreting the theory in this way, I hope to point to the relationships
between Ratnaki@rti's theory of semantics and his epistemology.
Did Digna@ga and Mallava@din know the Old Va@kya-padi@ya-vr@tti?
Ole Holten Pind
In his article 'Once again on the Authorship of the Tri-ka@nd@i@-Vr@tti'
(Études Asiatiques XLVI/1 (1993) 53, n. 18), Ashok Aklujkar writes that
'when a prose part of the extant V as preserved in its manuscripts É is
attested in the works of Digna@ga and Mallava@din, we would be able to
infer confidently that the V was known to them'. Since no one to the best
of my knowledge has attempted to analyse the available evidence with a
view to decide whether the sources permit us to draw any conclusion about
Digna@ga's or Mallava@din's knowledge of the old Va@kya-padi@ya-vr@tti,
I have found it worth while to investigate whether it is possible to answer
the question raised by Aklujkar. I shall also address the additional problem
of whether a grammatical quotation in Digna@ga's Prama@n@a-samuccaya can
reasonably be ascribed to Bhartr@hari's T@i@ka@ on the Maha@-bha@s@ya as
claimed by very late grammatical sources.
The paper first addresses Mallava@din's treatment of VP I in Naya-cakra.
It shows that Sim@hasu@rin's commentary makes it possible to conclude that
Mallava@din incorporated parts of the old vr@tti into his presentation
of the pu@rva-paks@a. Unfortunately there are big gaps in this part of
the vr@tti, but parallels to the extant parts of it and the fact that Sim@hasu@rin
does not distinguish between the author of the verses and the vr@tti makes
it possible to conclude with absolute certainty that the text which Mallava@din
quotes is identical with the old vr@tti.
Digna@ga's indebtedness to the Va@kya-padi@ya is well know. It is considerably
more difficult to decide with absolute certainty whether he also knew the
vr@tti. However, with the availability of the Sanskrit MS of Jinendrabuddhi's
Prama@n@a-samuccaya-t@i@ka@ we are on safer ground for making inferences.
The paper analyses those parts of the apoha chapter of PS V 44 in which
Digna@ga propounds his view of pratibha@, which he understands as the sum
total of exclusions, beginning with the exclusion at the level of the phoneme
through those that take place at the level of the morpheme to those belonging
to the level of the syntactical word. The analysis shows that pada d of
PSV 44 has been lifted from VP I 155. Unfortunately there is a big gap
in the VPV I so we are not in a position to decide whether Digna@ga's explication
is indebted to that part of the vr@tti. It is possible, though, to show
that there is a close parallel between certain statements of VPV I and
Digna@ga's own formulation that makes it reasonable to assume that he knew
the vr@tti. Especially Digna@ga's use of the term utpreks@a@ and its central
position in the VPV would indicate that. The conclusion that Digna@ga is
likely to have known the vr@tti is moreover strengthened by the fact that
he quotes, in his treatment of words denoting aggregates (samudaya-s%abda),
VP I 154-55 followed by examples that are identical with those found in
the relevant part of the vr@tti. It is thus reasonable to assume that Digna@ga
was familiar with the VPV.
In the commentary on PS V Digna@ga quotes a grammatical definition
of the uses of the so-called abstract affixes (bha@va-pratyaya) stating
that [The bha@va affix] denotes a connection when introduced after compounds,
[words] ending in kr@t and taddhita affixes, except (anyatra) when introduced
after idiomatic expressions, [words] whose form is not distinct, and [words]
whose connection is invariable (ru@d@hy-abhinna-ru@pa@vyabhica@rita-sambandhebhyah@).
Kaun@d@abhat@t@a claims that this quotation actually stems from Hari-t@i@ka@
but that the Mi@ma@m@sakas and the Naiya@yikas wrongly attribute it to
Ka@tya@yana. The paper addresses the question of whether the quotation
as such contains information that would favour the correctness of the attribution
to Hari. It concludes that among the other uses mentioned in the definition
only those pertaining to conventional terms and words whose connection
is invariable represent views that are not known from other sources before
Bhartr@hari. Especially the last mentioned property of the bha@va-affixes
is significantly linked with Bhartr@hari's metaphysics of Being (satta@)
and, moreover, is not known from other contemporary grammarians an philosophers.
The paper therefore concludes that it is highly likely that it is to be
attributed to Hari. Thus it is likely that Digna@ga knew both the VPV and
the Maha@-bha@s@ya-t@i@ka@.
Parley, Reason and Rejoinder
Ernst Prets (Vienna)
The early forms of Indian debate as represented by the section discussing
the method on debating (sam@bha@s@a@vidhi) of the Carakasam@hita@ and the
definitions of the first book of the Nya@yasu@tra, accepts rejoinders (ja@ti)
as valid means of dialectical refutation in disputation (jalpa) and eristic
wrangles (vitan@d@a@). In the earlier Buddhist manual *Upa@yahr@daya (fang-pien
hsin-lun), twenty of these refutations, which, according to Tucci's retranslation,
are called du@s@an@a, the pointing out of flaws in the argumentation of
the opponent, are defined as valid refutations of syllogistic arguments.
The aim of this presentation is to shed light on the practical use of these
rejoinders, as according to the first chapter of the fifth book of the
Nya@yasu@tra.
Inference, reasoning and causality in the Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@
Ferenc Ruzsa (Budapest)
The classical exposition of the Sa@m@khya philosophy, the Sa@m@khya-ka@rika@,
contains only scanty references to matters of logic. Its commentaries cannot
really help in the details, as their positions are mutually contradictory
and quite often logically too naive. The Yukti-di@pika@ and to some extent
Va@caspati Mis%ra's Sa@m@khya-tattva-kaumudi@ has important analyses, but
these are more closely connected to contemporary logical debate than to
the classical Sa@m@khya position; often the terminology and even the basic
categories are new.
Still it seems possible to reconstruct I@s%varakr@sn@a's conception
of inference, because it is integrated in two ways into his system. First
- and though it seems natural, it is a very rare phenomenon in philosophy
- his reasoning generally conforms to his theory; he can do this because
his "syllogism" is not too specific, it lacks unnecessary detail. Second,
his theory of cognition is in harmony with his theory of the world: inference
and causation have a parallel structure, because inference reproduces causal
relations.
This means among other things that both of them are strongly "object-oriented":
as the causal relation of sat-ka@rya ('caused by an existent [thing]')
obtains typically between things (and not e.g. events or states), so we
infer from the lig@ga (a thing or a quality of a thing) another thing,
the lig@gin. Inference is not a relation between sentences or propositions.
As a consequence of this it appears that there are only two avayavas, members
in the inferential process - the lig@ga or 'mark' in the place of the premiss,
and the lig@gin or 'the thing marked' as the conclusion.)
There are three kinds of inference, of which the firs two (not even
named in the text) are closely related, but not very important in philosophising.
1. A and B, both empirical, clearly defined, stand in a causal relation
A -> B; one of them is currently, accidentally, not seen. The inference
from A to B, i.e. A |- B is probably called pu@rvavat ('having the earlier'),
while B |- A would be s%esavat ('having the remainder'). Because causation
is far from a reliable equivalence-relation, the vi@ta - avi@ta distinction
is justified already here.
2. All [?] other inferences are sa@ma@nyato dr@st@a ('seen by the similarity').
The philosophically important case is when the (normally causal) relation
A -> B is known, and we infer: B' |- A', where B' is analogous to B (or
superordinated to B, or belongs to a category superordinated to B), and
A' is essentially not empirical.
Inductive, Deductive, Both, or Neither?
Mark Siderits (Illinois)
It has been common for scholars to ask whether the anuma@na is an inductive
argument or a deductive argument. I seek to show that this question is
based on several false assumptions. First, I argue, the distinction between
deductive and inductive arguments is itself highly problematic, in that
there is no principled way of drawing the distinction based on logical
considerations alone. And second, I claim that the anuma@na is not an argument,
but rather a particular sort of virtuous epistemic performance. Both claims
are based on the standard distinction between logic and epistemology, which
takes logic as the formal science of the truth-preserving relation, and
epistemology as an inquiry into the nature of knowledge. I close with the
suggestion that the approach to indirect knowledge adopted by the theorists
of the anuma@na might be preferable to an approach grounded in the standard
distinction.
Once More on Circles
Ernst Steinkellner (Vienna)
In an earlier paper "The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition
in Buddhism" (Nanto Bukkyo@ 57, 1982, 1 ff.) I said that "the structural
scheme of these ideas of Dharmaki@rti turns out to be a true circle" but
fell short of sufficiently clarifying my meaning thereby creating considerable
irritation subsequently. I still consider my original concept of such a
"true circle" valuable and would like to put it to test again with more
detailed and, hopefully, sufficiently clear argumentation.
[Place for future abstracts.]
October 7-10, 1999:
"ON UNDERSTANDING OTHER CULTURES" - International
Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies to Commemorate the Centenary
of the Birth of Stanislaw Schayer (1899-1941), Warsaw University (Under
the auspices of the Rector Magnificus of the Warsaw University).
For details please view: http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/pl/indologia/schayer.html
Organising Committee: Krzysztof Byrski (Honorary
President), Marek Mejor (President), Piotr Balcerowicz (Secretary), Danuta
Stasik, Agata Bareja-Starzynska.
PROCEEDINGS volume: On the Understanding of
Other Cultures. Proceedings of the International Conference on Sanskrit
and Related Studies to Commemorate the Centenary of the Birth of Stanislaw
Schayer (1899-1941), Warsaw University, Poland, October 7-10, 1999.
Edited by Piotr Balcerowicz and Marek Mejor. Studia Indologiczne 7, Warsaw
University, Warsaw 2000, 503 pages (format 245X170 mm). Contributors: Piotr
Balcerowicz, Horst Brinkhaus, John Brockington, Mary Brockington, Renata
Czekalska, Rahul Peter Das, Tatiana Y. Elizarenkova, Cezary Galewicz, Jonardon
Ganeri, Minoru Hara, Marzenna Jakubczak, Joanna Jurewicz, Klaus Karttunen,
Shoryu Katsura, Paolo Magnone, Halina Marlewicz, Marek Mejor, Kunwar Narain,
Claus Oetke, Hideyo Ogawa, Ernst Prets, Sven Sellmer, Francesco Sferra,
Lidia Sudyka, Satya Vrat Shastri, Danuta Stasik, Anna Trynkowska, Albrecht
Wezler. [A new edition is under preparation for Motilal Banarsidass].
8-9 September, 2000:
"ASPECTS OF JAINISM" - International Seminar
on Jainism, Warsaw University
Organisers: Marek Mejor and Piotr Balcerowicz
(Uniwersytet Warszawski).
Consultant: Albrecht Wezler (Universität Hamburg)
Participants: Nalini Balbir, Johannes Bronkhorst,
Piotr Balcerowicz, Colette Caillat, Christoph Emmrich, Peter Flügel, Adelheid
Mette, Jayandra Soni, Luitgard Soni, Kenji Watanabe, Albrecht Wezler.
PROCEEDINGS volume is under preparation for Motilal
Banarsidass (with papers of more contributors: John E. Cort, Phyllis Granoff,
Padmanabh S. Jaini, Kristi L. Wiley).
We wish to thank our sponsors:
http://www.julida.com.pl
and
and
Rector of Warsaw University
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